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AN RSVP TO PROFESSOR WEXLER'S
WARM THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
INVITATION TO THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE
BAR: UNABLE TO JOIN YOU, ALREADY
(SOMEWHAT SIMILARLY) ENGAGED
MAE C. QUINN*
Abstract: This Article responds to Professor David 13. Wexler's recent sug-
gestion that adopting Therapeutic Jurisprudence ("V) principles to cre-
ate a new type of "rehabilitative" defense lawyer could improve the crimi-
nal defense bar. Contrary to the empirical foundation of the therapeutic
justice movement, many of his proposed changes seem unsubstantiated.
Others, such as calls for creative plea bargaining, are already part of the
practice of quality defense attorneys. The "rehabilitative," -Pi defense law-
yer may be overly paternalistic, imposing his interpretation of the facts
and his standards of appropriate behavior on the accused; such a lawyer
also may not comport with express ethical standards. Instead, the tradi-
tion of zealous and quality advocacy, whether in a law school clinic or in a
public defender's office, best serves the interests of defendants.
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INTRODUCTION
For nearly two decades, Professors David B. Wexler and Bruce J.
Winick have considered, written about, and advocated a particular way
to study law—one that explicitly considers the therapeutic impact of
legal rules, procedures, and processes on those they affect. This distinct
approach to the law, which has garnered significant support over the
years, has been called the Therapeutic Jurisprudence ("TJ") move-
ment. Although the movement grew out of the mental health law arena
and concern for the law's treatment of the mentally ill, its scope has
expanded to other substantive areas. It has also moved from being a
school of thought largely rooted in theory to an affirmative reform ef-
fort that advocates a particular means of delivering justice in our
courts. Most recently, the TJ movement and its reform efforts have
turned to criminal law and practice. And most significantly, from this
author's perspective, it has set its sights on the unique work of criminal
defense lawyers and students in law school criminal defense clinics. As
this Article explains, however, this facet of the TJ movement presents
serious implications for the modern justice system.
As part of a recent law school symposium entitled Therapeutic juris-
prudence in Clinical Legal Education and Legal Skills Training, Professor
Wexler extended a "warm invitation" to "several communities," includ-
ing the criminal defense bar and clinical professors, to join him in the
TJ movement.' His invitation asks those communities to unite to rec-
ognize explicitly a special kind of criminal defense practitioner—the
"TJ criminal defense lawyer"—and to contribute to an agenda of re-
search, writing, teaching, and practice to foster this "new" role. 2 As de-
scribed by Professor Wexler, TJ defense attorneys would serve as thera-
peutic "change agents" within the justice system to actively encourage
clients to rehabilitate themselves, modify behaviors, and ultimately
David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Rehabilitative Role of the Criminal De-,
fense Lawyer, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 743, 746 (2005) [hereinafter Wexler, Rehabilitative
Rold. Professor Wexler's article is an extension of earlier work that sought to expand Tys
application to criminal defense practice. Most notably, it builds upon themes Professor
Winick raised in Redefining the Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer at Plea Bargaining and Sen-
tencing: A Therapeuticfwrisprudence/Preventative Law Model, 5 PsvcitoL. PUB. & L. 1034
(1999). Professors Wexler and Winick have continued to develop these ideas in further
writings. See generally. David B. Wexler, Some Reflections on Therapeutic jurisprudence and the
Practice of Criminal Law, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 205 (2002); Bruce j. Winick & David B. Wexler,
The Use of Therapeutic furispnalence in Law School Clinical Education: 'Transforming the Criminal
Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. P.m 605 (2006).
3 See Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 746-47.
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change their lives.5 As a clinician and former public defender, and in
the interest of contributing to the ongoing TJ conversation, I write to
respond to Professor Wexler. 4
I share some of Professor Wexler's concerns about the provision of
quality legal representation in this country. I fear, however, that extend-
ing TJ principles to criminal defense practice and law school clinic
work in the ways he suggests goes too far in pressing the limits of this
still very much evolving school of thought. Indeed, doing so may nega-
tively affect our legal system. This new practice-based "dimension" on]
seems to depart significantly from TJ proponents' prior claim that TJ "is
merely a lens' designed to shed light on interesting and normative is-
sues relating to the therapeutic impact of the law ... [and] does not
itself provide any of the answers."5 In fact, Professor Wexler's invitation
clearly offers what is supposed to be a correct answer to the question of
how lawyers and law school clinics should deliver criminal defense ser-
vices—using the TJ criminal defense model.6 Unfortunately, however,
this model not only runs the risk of displacing existing defense and
clinical community values, but may well conflict with ethical and legal
mandates for defense attorneys.
Part I of this Article recounts the development of the TJ move-
ment by Professors Wexler and Winick, its concern with the law's
therapeutic and antitherapeutic consequences, and the movement's
expansion from the mental health context and the world of theory to
other substantive areas of law and the world of practice.? In Part II, I
outline Professor Wexler's proposal to extend 'fp application to the
field of criminal defense work, and his invitation to practitioners and
clinicians to join him in promoting a TJ-Focused criminal defense bar,
whose members would act as therapeutic "change agents" within the
legal system and view client rehabilitation as a core value. 8 In Part III, I
consider and examine Professor Wexler's invitation, focusing on the
See id.
4 Professor Wexler has, in turn, responded to my RSVP, David B. Wexler, Not Such a
Party Pooper An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn's Concerns About Therapeutic
jurisprudence Criminal Defense "Angering, 48 B.C. L. Rsv. 597 (2007). The Boston College Law
Review has been kind enough to permit me a few pages at the end of this Article to offer
my thoughts on Professor Wexler's response. See infra notes 252-270 and accompanying
text.
5 David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Patients, Professionals, and the Path of Therapeutic. lu-
risprudencr A Response to Petrila, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN •HERA-
PEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 707,708 (t)avid B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996).
6 See Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 773-74.
7 See infra notes 14-55 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 56-133 and accompanying text.
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occasion (specifically, the advent of a new kind of defense bar), the
menu of best practices it offers, and the list of invitees who have been
asked to participate. 9
As Part III explains, although I am intrigued by Professor Wexler's
TJ ideas and agree in several respects with his observations about the
criminal justice system, I fear that his current call to action is somewhat
misguided. 10 On the one hand, many of the TJ practices Professor Wex-
ler urges are wholly consistent with current conceptions of good de-
fense lawyering. 11 On the other hand, some of the new ideas and prac-
tices suggested for TJ defense representation seem to be based upon
faulty assumptions about current defense practices, raise serious nor-
mative questions, and present a host of legal and ethical concerns for
defense attorneys and law clinic students alike.' 2 TJ defense representa-
tion, then, is no panacea for the problems facing our criminal justice
system.
Thus, despite the warmth with which it was extended, and my re-
spect for his well-meaning call to action, I feel the need to decline Pro-
fessor Wexler's invitation to join him in acknowledging a brand new
model of practitioner—the TJ criminal defense lawyer—or to foster
development of this special breed of attorney. Rather, as the Conclu-
sion of this Article indicates, I will continue with my prior (somewhat
similar) engagement of striving to provide good old-fashioned "zeal-
ous" and "quality" criminal defense representation, and encouraging
my students to do the same. 13
9 See infra notes 134-250 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 134-250 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 134-149 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 150-172 and accompanying text.
13 See NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASSN, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
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I. TJ THEORY: EVOLUTION OF A MOVEMENT 14
In the 1970s, Professors Wexler and Winick became interested in
"the interplay of law and psychology" in "the then nascent field of men-
tal health law.'" Some of their early work explored the tension between
society's interest in controlling the behaviors of those seen as deviant
because of mental health problems—for instance by way of civil com-
mitment—and the often conflicting individual interests of mentally ill
persons. 16 They expressed concern that the desire to use scientifically
based treatments to address mental illness had the potential to eclipse
other societal values, such as individual autonomy and personal free-
dom. 17 Thus, they cautioned against permitting "therapeutic efficacy"
to trump all other considerations in mental health law. 18
Over time, however, Professors Wexler and Winick shifted their
focus in the mental health arena. 19 Indeed, they began asking whether
mental health law, particularly in light of the expansion of client pro-
cedural rights and protections, was doing enough to meet clients' chili-
"Attempting to provide a summary of the TJ movement's teachings is a daunting task.
Professors Wexler and Winick's writings on the topic span many years and comprise thou-
sands of pages of books, medical journals, and law reviews, See infra note 38 and accompa-
nying text. Moreover, it is always challenging to summarize accurately others' views. This is
especially true here because some TJ claims have been described as presenting conceptual
dilemmas, and, at least to this reader, appear to conflict in a number of respects. See Chris-
topher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, in LAW IN A THERAPEU-
TIC KEY, supra note 5, at 763, 766. Thus, the reader will note my extensive use of direct
quotations in an attempt to convey as accurately as possible Professors Wexler and Winick's
proposals and suggestions. I have also dune my best throughout this Article to reconcile,
for purposes of synopsis, what appear to be competing TJ claims, noting potential signifi-
cant inconsistencies where relevant. I hope that this overview of TJ, particularly given my
genuine attempts to grapple with its various teachings, is accepted in the light in which it is
altered and not received as a personal indictment or characterized as a misinterpretation
of the work. See Wexler & Winick, supra note 5, at 707 (arguing that in his review of their
hook, Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Professor John Petrila "puts words in [their)
mouths and critiques [them] Ibr writing a book [they] did not (and would not) write").
15 David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Introduction to ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURIS-
PRUDENCE, at ix, ix (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991).
16 See DAVID B. WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH LAW: MAJOR ISSUES 1 1-57 (1981).
17 Id. at 29-31; see David B. Wexler, Therapeuticlurisprwdence and the Culture of Critique, in
PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 449, 452-53
(Dennis P. Stolle, David B. Wexler & Bruce .). Winick eds., 2000).
18 WEXLER, supra note 16, at 29-31; see David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Justice, 57 MINN. L.
Roc 289, 313 (1972) (stating that "it should be clear that the eradication of deviance
ought not be society's superseding goal").
19 BRUCE J. WINICK, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL
HEALTH LAW 12 (1997) ("What can be called the first stage of mental health law was heav-
ily influenced by the civil rights movement and the Warren Court era's developments in
the areas of criminal procedure and prisoners' rights.").
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cal needs. 20 They claimed that they still "applauded" mental health
law's "civil libertarian" focus, but wondered if it was now failing to draw
sufficiently from the behavioral sciences. 21
Specifically, Professors Wexler and Winick feared that mental
health law potentially harmed clients more than helped them by pro-
moting "psychological dysfunction" rather than psychological well-
being.22 Such harm, they opined, could result from the application of
substantive laws, procedures employed in courts, or the very roles
played by judges and lawyers in mental health proceedings. 23 For in-
stance, substantive rules that give individuals the right to refuse treat-
ment might inhibit the underlying therapeutic aims of mental health
law. 24 Commitment hearings, although intended to ensure that men-
tally ill clients receive treatment, might exacerbate clients' conditions
by subjecting them to stress and embarrassment during the legal proc-
ess. 26 Judges and lawyers, too, might individually behave in ways that
undermine therapy goals. 26 Such consequences might be "antithera-
peutic" for the very individuals mental health law was intended to assist.
20 David B. Wexler, An Introduction to Therapeutic jurisprudence, in THERAPEUTIC JURIS-
PRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT 3, 3 (David B. Wexler ed., 1990).
21 Id. at 3-4.
22 David B. Wexler, An Introduction to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEU-
TIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 15, at 17, 19-23.
23 Id. at 24-35; see also WiNtcx, supra note 19, at 4. Winick notes:
Once it is understood that rules of substantive law, legal procedures, and the
roles of various actors in the legal system such as judges and lawyers have ei-
ther positive or negative effects on the health and mental health of the peo-
ple they affect, the need to assess these therapeutic consequences ... thus
emerges as an important objective in any sensible law reform effort.
WINICK, supra note 19, at 4.
24 See Wexler, supra note 22, at 24-30; see also WINICK, supra note 19, at 67-91 (examin-
ing the therapeutic and antitherapeutic implications of the right to refuse mental health
treattnen t),
25 See Wexler, supra note 22, at 30-32; see also David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Thera-
peutic jurisprudence as a New Research Tool, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, MOM
note 15, at 303, 307-08 ("[Olne interested in therapeutic jurisprudence could mine the
procedural justice literature with a view to considering how legal proceedings in the men-
tal health area—such as commitment and conditional release hearings—might be modi-
fied to increase a litigant-patient's perception of fairness and perhaps to increase treat-
ment compliance and treatment efficacy.").
26 Wexler, supra note 22, at 33-35; see also WINICK, supra note 19, at 4; Bruce J. Winick,
Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Ziner-
mon v. Burch, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, SUpra note 15, at 83, 132 (opin-
ing that "[fJor too long, lawyers and doctors have been in an adversary posture in the hos-
pitalization process, sometimes with the result that the patient becomes a casualty").
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Thus, Wexler and Winick instructed that we should "be sensitive to
those consequences" and "ask whether [they] can be reduced, and [the
law's] therapeutic consequences be enhanced, without subordinating
due process and other justice values."27 As they stated elsewhere, the
law's "positive and negative consequences [should] be studied with the
tools of the behavioral sciences, and ... consistent with considerations
of justice and other relevant normative values ... [should] be reformed
to minimize anti-therapeutic consequences and to facilitate achieve-
ment of therapeutic ones."28
This way of thinking formed the basis For 'Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence," or "Til" —the school of thought that Professors Wexler and
Winick established around 1990. 29 Thus, Tj's initial underlying premise
was "that mental health law would better serve society if major efforts
were undertaken to study, and improve, the role of law as a therapeutic
agent."89 It sought, therefore, "to reorient the field of mental health law
to better capitalize on its multidisciplinary potential"st and "become
more sensitive to insights from the mental health disciplines." 82
Notably, Wexler and Winick also claimed that "Ibly suggesting the
need to identify the therapeutic and antitherapeutic consequences of
legal rules and practices," they were not "necessarily suggest[ing] that
such rules and practices be recast to accomplish therapeutic ends or
avoid antitherapeutic results"" or that "therapeutic considerations
should trump other considerations." 34 Rather, 11 was merely a tool—
one that could be used to identify "questions in need of empirical re-
27 David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Introduction to LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra
note 5, at xvii, xvii.
28 Dennis B. Stolle, David B. Wexler, Bruce J. Winick & Edward A. Dauer, Integrating
Preventive Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Law and Psychology Based Approach to Lawyer-
ing, in PRACTICING THERAPEuTic JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 17, at 5, 7.
29 Id.; see also WINICK, supra note 19, at 11 (explaining that Wexler and Winick began
using the term "Therapeutic Jurisprudence" in conference presentations during the late
1980s, but first wrote about it in 1990); Slohogin, supra note 14, at 763 (noting that Wexler
and Winick introduced the idea of Therapeutic jurisprudence in the early 1990s); Dennis
P. Stolle, Introduction to PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 17, at xv, xv
(noting that Wexler and Winick "formally introduced therapeutic jurisprudence as a dis-
tinct legal theory, about a decade ago").
" David B. Wexler, Preface to THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT, supra note 20, at vii,
vii.
'I Id,
St Id.; see also WINICK, supra note 19, at 4 ("Accomplishing positive therapeutic conse-
quences or eliminating or minimizing antitherapeutic consequences thus emerges as an
important objective in any sensible law reform effort.").
" Wexler & Winick, supra note 15, at xi.
" Wexler & Winick, supra note 27, at xvii.
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search" and that "set[s] the stage" for conversations about what might
occur when therapeutic values happen to conflict with other societal
values, such as "individual autonomy, integrity of the fact-finding proc-
ess, community safety," or others." Thus, TJ seemed to propose an af-
firmative agenda for reforming existing non therapeutic laws and pro-
cedures, but also purported to serve as nothing more than a lens
through which to examine and analyze such existing elements.
Over time, TJ received significant support, in no small measure
due to Professors Wexler and Winick's thoughtful advocacy and genu-
ine enthusiasm for its teachings. Indeed, although they conceded that
TJ theory applied most naturally to mental health law, they forecast its
eventual spread to a range of legal areas." Thcy themselves began us-
ing TJ to examine other legal issues, although at the outset their writ-
ings tended to have some connection to the mental health arena."
Professors Wexler and Winick urged others to join them in em-
bracing TJ, resulting in the production of a voluminous body of schol-
arship that applies TJ principles to a host of concerns." In this way, TJ
has shifted its focus from mental health, to dealing with "quasi" mental
55 Id.; see also Wexler & Winick, supra note 5, at 708. Wexler and Winick note:
We have repeatedly emphasized the fact that therapeutic jurisprudence is
merely a lens" designed to shed light on interesting and important empirical
and normative issues relating to the therapeutic impact of the law. The thera-
peutic jurisprudence perspective sets the stage for the articulation and debate
of those questions, and hence has the potential for reinvigorating the field, but
it does not itself provide any of the answers.
Wexler & Winick, supra note 5, at 708.
36 Wexler & Winick, supra note 15, at x (predicting 'Us future application to family, ju-
venile, and criminal law).
57 For instance, Professor Wexler coauthored articles with Robert F. Schopp that exam-
ined mental health malpractice litigation and negligence claims against psychotherapists.
See generally Robert F. Schopp & David B. Wexler, Shooting Yourself in the Foot with Due Co;?:
Psychotherapists and Crystallized Standards of Tort Liability, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURIS-
PRUDENCE, supra note 15, at 157; David B. Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When to
Correct for Juror Hindsight Bias in Mental Health Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary Obser-
vations, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 15, at 135.
38 Marjorie A. Silver, Professional Responsibility and the Affective Assistance of Counsel 7
(Oct. 27, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at hap://www.law.ucla.edu/docs/silver_
mado•ie_-_profrespalTectiveasstcounsel.pdf. Professor Silver notes:
A glance at the bibliography of the website of the International Network on
Therapeutic jurisprudence graphically demonstrates the impact and growth
of TJ on our legal culture. It lists twenty-five books and monographs, twenty-
one symposia and 749 articles, all published over the past fifteen years, the
vast majority over the past five or six years.
Id. (citation omitted).
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health issues,39 to being an amorphous movement that advocates the
application of "therapeutic" principles in a broad range of settings—
even those where litigants have not been diagnosed with mental ill-
ness.4° For instance, scholars have applied Tj to everything from duty-
to-rescue rules in child abuse matters 41 to policies relating to gays and
lesbians in the military. 42 They generally examine the "therapeutic" or
"antitherapeutic" consequences of the laws under consideration, based
on the extent to which they promote the "psychological well-being" of
those affected by them.43 TJ scholarship has gone so far as to consider
the law's therapeutic impact on judges, lawyers, and juries, considering
whether their psychological well-being is affected by the law and its
processes."
Despite Tys popularity, it has not been without critics. For in-
stance, in the mid-1990s, at least two scholars examined the tensions
and ambiguities in its teachings. They warned that Ti's lack of clear pa-
rameters and terminology, if not addressed, would present serious effi-
39 See Table of Contents to LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, St4pra note 5, at vii, vii (entitling
section LB "'Quasi' Mental Health Law").
40 WINICK, supra note 19, at 12 ("[T]herapeutic jurisprudence has now been applied to
analyze issues in correctional law, criminal law, family law and juvenile law, sexual orienta-
tion law, disability law, health law, evidence law, personal injury law, labor arbitration law,
contract and commercial law, workers' compensation law, probate law, and the legal pro-
fession.").
91 See generally Daniel W. Shuman, The Duty of the State to Rescue the Vulnerable in the
United States, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, sepia note 5, at 299.
42 See generally Kay Kavanaugh, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Deception Required, Disclosure Denied,
in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 5, at 343.
45 See Shuman, supra. note 41, at 299-300 ("Rescue [of abused children] proceeds on
the assumption that it will be therapeutic; we encourage rescue because we think it will he
beneficial to the physical or emotional health of the person rescued. If legal intervention
on behalf of abused children lacks a therapeutic outcome, then a duty to rescue may leave
children worse off than if no intervention had occurred."); see also Kavanaugh, supra note
42, at 343-44 (arguing that rules relating to gays in the military are antitherapentic both
for homosexual service members who feel pressured to conceal their sexual identity, and
for heterosexual service members "because [the rules] encourage and perpetuate preju-
dice that is based on ignorance and deter the development of productive relationships").
See generally Rose Daly-Rooney, Designing Reasonable Accommodations Through Co-Worker Par-
ticipation.: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Confidentiality Provision of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, 811— & HEALTH 89 (1994); Ronald .), Rychlack & Corey D. Hinshaw, From the
Classroom to the Courtroom: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Gaming Industry's Impact on Law,
74 Miss. L.J. 827 (2005).
44 See, e.g., Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic fulisprudence Within the Comprehensive
Law Movement, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 17, at 465, 467;
Daniel W. Shuman et al., The Health Effects ofJury Service, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY,
supra note 5, at 949, 949; James L. Nolan, Jr., 'therapeutic Adjudication, SocarrY, Jan.—Feb.
2002, at 29, 38.
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cacy problems for the movement.* Professor John Petrila, perhaps one
of the strongest early critics of TJ theory, argued that despite TJ's re-
ported concern for individual autonomy, its focus on therapeutic out-
comes was largely paternalistic and could work to disempower indi-
viduals who were seen as psychologically impaired." More fundamen-
tally, he argued, Professors Wexler and Winick "fail[ed] to articulate
clear decision rules for determining ... whether and under what cir-
cumstances therapeutic values must yield to other values," or when any
given outcome would be considered therapeutic as opposed to anti-
therapeutic.47 Professor Christopher Slobogin, although more sympa-
thetic to TJ than Petrila, agreed that TJ theory presented serious con-
ceptual dilemmas, including how best to define the term "therapeutic,"
measure the therapeutic value of any given outcome, and balance that
value against others."
Professors Wexler and Winick attempted to address these critiques.
For instance, in a reply to Professor Petrila's article, they reaffirmed
their commitment to the interests of the mentally ill, arguing, in rele-
vant part, that autonomous decision making and individual choice are
clearly stated core concerns of TJ.49 As for the questions raised about
the term "therapeutic," in a 1995 article, Professor Wexler offered:
Therapeutic jurisprudence has been criticized for not offer-
ing a clear-cut definition of the term therapeutic. As a mere
lens or heuristic for better seeing and understanding the law,
however, I think therapeutic jurisprudence has quite rightly
opted not to provide a tight definition of the term, thereby al-
lowing commentators to roam within the intuitive and com-
mon sense contours of the concept.
45 See John Petrila, Paternalism and the Unrealized Promise of Essays in Therapeutic fillispru-
dente, in LAW' IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 5, at 685, 685-705; Slobogin, supra note 14,
at 763-93. See generally Richard Boldt & Jana Singer, Ju ►istocrag in the Trenches: Problem-Solving
fudges and ThempeuticJurisprudence in Drug Treatment Courts and Unified Family Courts, 65 MD. L.
RP:v. 82 (2006); Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic jurisprudence, NeaRehabilitationism, and Judicial
Colledivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes the Most Dangemas, 29 FORNIAM URn. L.J. 2063
(2002); Arthur G. Christean, Thenipentic Jurisprudence: Embracing a Tainted Ideal, http://
psychrights.org/Articles/TherapeutidurisprudenceTaintedIdeatlitm
 (last visited Mar. 12,
2007).
46 Petrila, supra note 45, at 695-700.
47 Id. at 694-95.
48 Slobogin, supra note 14, at 763-93.
49 Wexler & Winick, supra note 5, at 711-12.
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Although the definition of the term therapeutic ... needs
to be left very flexible for promoting research, it is also
probably true that, to preserve the camaraderie (and efficient
work) of a common scholarly community, there ought to be
some notion about the core concept and its rough bounds. In
that connection it is noteworthy that the therapeutic jurispru-
dence literature to date has overwhelmingly conformed to ar-
eas within the ordinary mental health connotation of the
term therapeutic: mental health-mental illness and health, ill-
ness, injury, disability, treatment, rehabilitation, and habilita-
tion....
Therefore, what is meant by therapeutic far exceeds the re-
versal of psychosis. On the other hand, the term therapeutic
has not yet become (and in my view for research purposes
ought not to become) synonymous with simply achieving in-
tended or desirable outcomes. 5°
With regard to the relative weight to be accorded therapeutic out-
comes and what to do when therapeutic goals conflict with other nor-
mative values, in his 1997 book, Professor Winick claimed that such
matters were not intended to be addressed by
While therapeutic jurisprudence is premised on the notion
that [mental] health is a value that law should seek to foster, it
makes no attempt to assign relative values to the various other
goals of law. To resolve such conflicts of value, one must go
outside therapeutic jurisprudence to some ethical or political
theory that establishes a hierarchy of values. In our political
system this balancing is often performed by the legislature
which, within our democratic traditions, attempts to reflect
the will of the citizenry. When fundamental constitutional
rights are involved, the task is often performed by the courts,
and ultimately by the Supreme Court, the institution in our
governmental structure that is assigned the role of safeguard-
ing constitutional values and protecting them from erosion by
majoritarian pressure.
Therapeutic jurisprudence suggests that legislatures and
courts should consider therapeutic values in the balancing of
competing interests and concerns [—]that is the essential task
50 David B. Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic fwisprudence, in LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 5, at 81], 812-14.
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of law-making. But although therapeutic jurisprudence is
normative in this regard, it is careful to acknowledge the rele-
vance of other normative values and does not suggest that
they be subordinated to therapeutic considerations. 51
Thus, although Professors Wexler and Winick seemed to concede
TJ was striving to change the law and its focus, they suggested that TJ
itself, as merely a school of thought, was not empowered to effectuate
modif•cations.52 Rather "true decisionmakers" like legislators and poli-
cymakers would need to reform the law and legal system."
Adding to the layers and complexity of TJ's purpose and identity,
in more recent years Professors Wexler and Winick have advanced an-
other "dimension" of TJ—application of its teachings to real-world legal
practice." They claim that absent any changes in substantive laws,
judges and practicing lawyers can use TJ principles to guide their ac-
WINICK, supra note 19, at 4-7. In a more recent text, Professors Wexler and Winick
explained:
Therapeutic jurisprudence is an interdisciplinary approach to law that builds
on the basic insight that law is a social force that has inevitable (if unin-
tended) consequences for the mental health and psychological function of
those it affects. Therapeutic Jurisprudence suggests that these positive and
negative consequences be studied with the tools of the behavioral sciences,
and that, consistent with considerations of justice and other relevant normative values,
law he reformed to minimize anti-therapeutic consequences and to facilitate
achievement of therapeutic ones.
Stolle et al., supra note 28, at 7 (emphasis added). Likewise, in the introduction to Essays in
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Wexler and Winick explained:
Let us, at the outset, emphasize that therapeutic jurisprudence does not em-
brace a vision of law ... serving exclusively or primarily therapeutic ends... .
The law serves many ends, and our suggestion that the impact on therapeutic
values of legal rules and practices should he analyzed does not mean that
therapeutic values should predominate over others.
Wexler & Winick, supra note 15, at xi.
52 Wexlcr & Winick, supra note 5, at 708.
53 Id.
54 See David 13. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psychological Soft spa, and
Strategies, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 17, at 45, 45 (stating
that this approach looks not only at possible law reform, but pays attention, too, to how
existing law—whatever it is—may be applied in a manner more conducive to the psycho-
logical well-being of those it affects"); see also David B. Wexler, The Development of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: From Theory to Practice, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R.• 691, 696 (1999).
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tions and behaviors, thereby transforming their roles within the court
system.55
II. PROFESSOR WEXLER'S INVITATION TO HELP ESTABLISH A TJ-
ORIENTED CRIMINAL DEFENSE BAR
In his recent article, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Rehabilitative
Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, Professor Wexler turns his attention
to criminal defense practitioners. 56 He contends that although many
criminal court judges have already begun applying TJ principles, for
instance in drug and domestic violence cases, and in matters where de-
fendants stiffer from mental illness, few defense attorneys arc doing the
same.57 Titus, he suggests defense attorneys should rethink the manner
in which they represent clients, in light of TJ and its concern for thera-
peutic well-being. 58
A. if Theory: Defense Attorneys as Rehabilitative Change Agents
Indeed, Professor Wexler has extended a "warm invitation" to "in-
volved practitioners" and what he calls "their academic counterparts"—
clinical law professors—to join him in rethinking the role of defense
counse1.59 His invitation calls for "the explicit recognition" of a special
breed of defense attorney, the "Ti criminal lavqer."6° He explains that
TJ criminal lawyers would have a far broader role than "traditional"61
criminal defense attorneys, as they would not only serve as legal repre-
sentatives, but therapeutic "change agents." 62 For Professor Wexler, this
means encouraging "positive change" and transformation in clients by
55 See generally PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, Supra note 17; JUDGING IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND 'ME COURTS (Bruce J. Winick &
David B. Wexler eds., 2003).
56 Welder, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 743.
57 Id. Wexler urges defense attorneys to keep pace with TJ's rapid move from the
"world of theory to the world of practice." Id.
58 Id. at 743-44.
59 Id. at 746. Professor Wexler seems to count this author, along with defense attorneys
Martin Reisig and John V. McShane, among those who are considered "involved practitio-
ners." See id. at 746 n.14.
60 Id. at 746. Professor Wexler also suggests that ''social workers, criminologists, psy-
chologists academics working in Therapeutic Jurisprudence and in criminal law ...
and their students ... would be highly valuable partners in this enterprise." Id.
GI As noted further at infra notes 134-149 and accompanying text, using the term "tra-
ditional" to describe the practices of defense counsel is somewhat problematic because it
erroneously implies an existing monolithic method of providing defense representation.
62 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 745-46.
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adopting a decidedly rehabilitation-focused stance. 63 And ideally, de-
fense counsel's "rehabilitative role" would continue well after resolu-
tion of the charges, extending "beyond sentencing, into corrections,
conditional or unconditional release, and to life in the community."64
Given this suggested metamorphosis in attorney role, the relation-
ship between counsel and client would change, too. 65 Professor Wexler
claims that "the proposed attorney-client relationship bears virtually no
resemblance" to many of the attorney-client relationships that currently
exist, particularly those involving public defenders. 66 Rather, he seems
to envision the attorney-client relationship as being more like what is
often seen in drug treatment courts. 67 In these relationships, Professor
Wexler posits, attorneys spend time cultivating trust and respect, for
instance, by allowing clients to tell their stories "unconstrained by rigid
notions of legal relevance." 68 In addition to motivating those they rep-
resent to participate actively in rehabilitative efforts, TJ attorneys would
also "foster [1 client hope and expectancy."69 What Professor Wexler
refers to as "emotional intelligence and cultural competence" arc also
seen as key to the TJ attorney-client relationship. 7°
B. TJ Theory in Practice: Suggested Methods
In inviting criminal defense lawyers and clinicians to recognize and
encourage this "new" kind of practice, Professor Wexler urges them to
write articles and practice-based materials that not only examine "the
rehabilitative potential of applying the current law therapeutically," but
also suggest reform of current laws, procedures, and practices to permit
greater rehabilitative or therapeutic possibilities. 71 Despite this apparent
tension between T3 goals and at least some current norms and rules,
Professor Wexler provides a list of proposed "best practices" he suggests
attorneys, clinicians, and clinic students can employ now at various
65 Id. at 747.
64 Id. at 772. Notably, Professor Wexler does not provide a definition for the term "re-
habilitative" as part of his invitation. See infra notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
65 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 747.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 748. In such courts, defense counsel is called upon to serve with the judge and
prosecutor as part of a treatment "team." Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I On Anyway? Mus-
ings of a Public Defender About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 37, 38 (2000-01).
68 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note I, at 748.
69 Id. at 747-48.
79 Id, at 748.
71 Id. at 746.
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"stages" of criminal proceedings to become TJ criminal defense law-
yers.72 These "stages"—none of which include trial—and the suggested
model practices are outlined below. 73
1. Diversion and Problem-Solving Courts
Professor Wexler describes effective TJ-focused attorneys as being
aware of all nonadjudicative and plea-based options for resolving
cases. 74 For instance, they should know about diversionary schemes
available 75 and purported "problem-solving court" options, including
eligibility requirements. 76 Professor Wexler concedes, however, that
many "problem-solving courts" present efficacy issues. For instance, he
notes that one studied court required a guilty plea prior to participa-
tion even though nearly one-third of defendants will fail out of the pro-
gram, thereby resulting in imposition of jail or prison sentences. 77
implies, however, that lack of knowledge of such shortcomings is what
renders an attorney less than stellar by T.1 measures. Thus, he urges at-
torneys to be aware of "the actual functioning of the[se] courts and
programs, including rates of successful graduation versus the 'flunk
out' rate, and the amount of time an average client might expect to
spend in jail (for being sanctioned) under a [drug treatment court]
program as compared to expected jail time in the conventional jail sys-
tem."78 In this way they can inform clients of the risks of such institu-
tions, ensure "true client consent" in accepting a drug court plea, and
72 Id, at 745.
73 See infra notes 74-118 and accompanying text.
71 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note I, at 747.
75 Id. at 748-49. Professor Wexler suggests that "a worthwhile interdisciplinary re-
search project would be to detail the law and practice of diversion in a particular jurisdic-
tion." Id. Many forms of diversion allow a defendant to avoid any penalty whatsoever, for
instance by agreeing to remain arrest free for a certain period of time, and also involve no
admission of guilt. See NY CRIM, PROC. LAW § 170.55 (McKinney 1999).
76 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 749.
17 Id. at 750. Professor Wexler also notes that some drug treatment programs used in
specialty courts lack bona fides and that some clients will spend as much time in jail follow-
ing a drug court plea, presumably through sanctions, as they would have under a standard
guilty plea. Id. at 749-50 nn.32-33. Indeed, Wexler seems to favor the use of pre-plea
treatment courts over post-plea institutions. See id. at 753.
Beyond this, Professor Wexler concedes that presently there may be limits placed on
defense counsel involvement in drug treatment court review hearings, in part because they
may be viewed as nonessential to the proceedings. Id. at 751, 763 n.84. After recounting
that one judge only tells retained counsel to come if he expects "to be mean" to the client,
he offers that "[t]his raises an interesting question regarding costs, therapeutic aims, and
retained versus publicly-provided legal services." Id. at 762 n.82.
78 Id. at 799.
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protect against antitherapeutic results—like the client feeling "sold
out. "79
Professor Wexler further suggests that potential drug treatment
court clients should sit in on a treatment court session with their attor-
ney or the lawyer's staff before deciding to enter a treatment court
guilty plea." The attorneys or staff could work to enhance the thera-
peutic nature of this experience by "maximizing . vicarious learning by
sitting through the session and explaining to the prospective [drug
treatment court] client exactly what is happening and why different
clients are receiving different dispositions."81
2. Pleas and Sentencing Consideration
Pointing out that most cases are resolved by a guilty plea, Professor
Wexler submits that "a TJ criminal lawyer will in appropriate cases try to
assemble a rehabilitation-oriented packet to present to the prosecutor
in hopes of securing a favorable plea arrangement." 82 If that does not
occur, a TJ lawyer could share the information with the judge at sen-
tencing.83
In advising a client whether to accept a plea offer, a TJ lawyer will
explain how the client's early acceptance of responsibility might be
perceived by the court and that the judge might offer sentence leni-
ency where an early admission is seen as genuine rather than strate-
gic.84 Thus, a TJ lawyer might try "to work with the client to create
genuineness even within a strategic legal context." 83 This could be ac-
complished with a psychological – perspective-taking' approach," where
the defendant is asked to "re-enact the crime, playing the role of the
victim," view videotapes of victim statements, or write an apology letter
taking into account the ways in which the victim's life has been affected
by the crime."
79 Id. at 749-50.
89 Id. at 751. Professor Wexler suggests that "many" clients are free on bail prior to en-
tering into treatment court programs and can therefore attend such proceedings. Id.
81 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 752 (emphasis added). These could serve
as therapeutically positive experiences by giving the client "a glimpse of the hard work, but
also of the opportunity and hope for real recovery that lies ahead." Id.
82 Id. at 753.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 753-54. This advice would be in addition to any information about the poten-
tial sentence following an unsuccessful trial.
as Id, at 755.
A" Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 755.
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Beyond this, Professor Wexler explains that the TJ lawyer will con-
sider the supposed intrinsic value of an admission of guilt: "A genuine
acceptance of responsibility—especially if coupled with an apology—is
generally regarded as therapeutically welcome by the victim and as a
good first rehabilitative step for the defendant." 87
3. Deferred Sentencing and Post-Offense Rehabilitation
According to Professor Wexler, even after the plea has been en-
tered, defense attorneys can continue to engage in rehabilitation-
focused, TJ practices. 88 For example, defense attorneys may postpone
sentencing for as long as possible because "[i]n order to accomplish
some meaningful rehabilitation—rather than a mere gesture, however
genuine—it is of course important to have time on your side."89 And
even though the federal sentencing guidelines expressly permit the
sentencing judge to take into account post-offense rehabilitation, as
in the case of United States v. Flowers," state courts without such legal
authority might also be inclined to consider such conduct favorably at
the time of sentencing.91
4. Probation
"The sanction of probation," too, Professor Wexler submits "is
chock-full of TJ considerations, which can inform and enrich the role
of defense counsel."92 Although the TJ lawyer is not expected to be a
therapist or social worker," some psychology-based concepts like com-
pliance and relapse prevention principles might be part of the tools
used by an effective TJ lawyer in the context of a client facing a proba-
tionary sentence."
Compliance principles include having the client actively propose
the terms of probation.95 The client, Professor Wexler submits, will be
87 Id. at 754.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 756.
90 983 F, Supp. 159,163-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
91 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note I, at 755-56.
92 Id. at 756.
95 Id. at 747-48.
" Id. at 757.
95 Id.
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more likely to comply with a plan when it is her own idea. 96 The TJ law-
yer should talk about the plan as a "behavioral contract" the client has
entered into with the court, 97 and consider having the client's family
and friends help to enforce the contract. 98
Relapse prevention principles can be used to come up with the
proposed probationary terms." For example, Professor Wexler suggests
the lawyer should have clients "think through the chain of events that
lead them to criminality so that they may be aware of patterns and of
high risk situations" that may lead them to reoffend. 1" As an example
of such a risky situation or pattern, Professor Wexler offers that youths
often have car accidents when they have other youths in their vehi-
eles.wl Thus, a young person who is repeatedly "picked up for driving
violations" might be asked by his lawyer: "Well, when do you seem to be
picked up ? Day or night? When you are alone or when you are with
others? Which others? Your parents? Your friends?" 1 °2 In this way, the
client will come to realize what the risky behavior is, and the lawyer can
ask the client how this could be used as part of a probationary plan.
96 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 760. Professor Wexler explains that this is
because the client will understand the terms fully and not view the plan as merely a matter
of "judicial fiat." Id.
97 Id. For even greater therapeutic benefit, the client should be encouraged,to person-
ally present the plan to the court and engage the judge on her own behalf at sentencing.
Id. at 760-61.
98 Id. at 757,761. This is assuming, Professor Wexler offers, that "the client truly agrees
with the idea of [family] involvement." Id. at 761.
99 Id. at 760. The process of coming up with the proposed terms, Professor Wexler
submits, is another Tj moment that can focus on compliance. The lawyer can prepare by
pitching counterargtunents to the client's claims that he will succeed. Id. at 761. According
to Professor Wexler, "Rdne would hope the client would personally come up with a suit-
able answer" that "Otis time is different." Id.
100 Id. at 757. Professor Wexler suggests the TJ attorney might walk the client through
potential future high risk situations, and problem-solve ways to avoid such situations. Id. In
another text, Professors Wexler and Winick state:
[C]linical law students need to learn 	 . the rewind exercise. it is a good
technique both for teaching clients about how to avoid future problems and for
teaching law students about how to see legal problems from a preventive per-
spective. The idea is a simple one.... In helping the client avoid a future re-
occurrence of the problem, it is helpful for the lawyer to assist the client to un-
derstand why the problem occurred. Let us "rewind" the situation back in time to
prior to the occurrence of the critical acts or omissions that produced the
problem. What could the client have done at this point to have avoided the
problem? What can he or she do now to avoid its reoccurrence?
Winick & Wexler, supra note 1, at 611.
1 ° 1 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 759.
102 Id. at 760.
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That is, the youth "hopefully" will respond that she will agree to drive
only with adults or responsible peers, or alone.'"
The above exchange, Professor Wexler concedes, looks like "a kind
of Socratic dialogue," where the lawyer is leading the client to the de-
sired answer.'" He suggests, however, that in the "division of labor," the
client must think through alternatives and ultimately "buy into a
change of behavior that should reduce the risk of criminality." 1°5
"[P]roposing a plan for the client's acquiescence" would be inappro-
priate in a TJ attorney-client relationship. 106
Professor Wexler also says TJ lawyers should be open to innova-
tive probation term possibilities. 107 For instance, without definitively
offering his imprimatur, he raises the possibility of the TJ lawyer ask-
ing a client with several children, who has been convicted of failing to
pay child support, whether he might consider having a vasectomy to
influence the court favorably. 1 °8 Thus, he implies clients might be en-
couraged to take steps to appease the court, even if the court were
prohibited as a matter of law from ordering such steps to be taken."
if probation is going well and it is permitted by law, TJ counsel
would also move for early termination of probation."° Upon termina-
tion, as occurs in problem-solving courts, the TJ attorney should make




105 Id. at 759.
106 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 759.
Iv Id. at 762.
108 Id. at 764-66. As an example, Professor Wexler points to the case of State v. Oakley,
629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001). Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 764; see also generally
Andrew Horowitz, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial Moralizing: Some Proposals for Curbing
Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 75 (2000) (criticizing the case
for going too far in trying to control the life of a probationer). In Oakley, the defendant, a
father of nine children, was convicted for refusing to pay child support. 629 N.W.2d at
202-03. The court ordered, as a condition of probation, that the defendant have no more
children, unless he was able to support them—a condition that was upheld 011 appeal. Id.
L99 See Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 766.
110 Professor Wexler suggests that judges conduct probation review hearings, "taking a
page from the apparently successful ongoing judicial supervision practices of drug treat-
ment court." Id. at 761, TJ defense counsel can play a role at such hearings by "marshal-
ling, with the client, impressive evidence of success, and presenting it to the court, thereby
helping to reinforce desistance from criminal activity." Id. at 762.
ill Id.
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5. Corrections, Reentry, and Beyond
For clients facing incarceration, Professor Wexler offers that "the
TJ criminal lawyer should, at some point, engage the client in a dia-
logue regarding the sentence and the future," including early release
options and "good time" credit possibilities." 2 And although defen-
dants are not constitutionally entitled to counsel at such proceedings,
"Din Therapeutic Jurisprudence terms, there is much meaningful work
for an attorney at the parole grant hearing stage," Loans Not only
could a TJ lawyer advocate for the client's release before the parole
board, but she could work with the client "and others to establish a
plan ... for conditional release."" 4
Once a client has been released from prison or jail, Professor Wex-
ler submits that a TJ lawyer might continue in her therapeutic efforts by
"help[ing the client] in the tremendously difficult task of reentry and
readjustment, talking with the client about post-release conditions and
collateral consequences that might impede the client's adjustment, and
offering to assist the client with restoring her rights and expunging her
criminal record." 115
6. Appeal
The appellate process, Professor Wexler contends, is another stage
where TJ criminal Iawyering can take place because "TJ considerations
abound in the kind of conversations lawyers should have with clients
both before an appellate brief is filed and in the aftermath of an appel-
late determination." 116 For instance, the TJ lawyer should communicate
meaningfully with her client, notifying her of the issues to be raised and
the law relating to the claims, and giving her a realistic sense of what
outcome to expect.'" TJ lawyers should also consider carefully how to
convey an unsuccessful outcome on appeal, trying not to suggest to the
112 Id. at 769.
113 Id. at 771.
114 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 771. Professor Wexler also mentions the
recent development of reentry courts, which "borrow from the drug court model" as a
means of "reinvigaratlingl the parole process." Id. at 770. lie notes that although sonic of
these institutions actually have conditional release authority, like parole boards, others are
intended to work with former inmates who are released unconditionally to ensure
"smoother reentry." Id. Professor Wexler suggests that he is in favor of both kinds of reen-
try courts. See id. at 771 n.117.
115 Id. at 771.
116 Id. at 766.
117 Id. at 768,
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client that she did not have a "voice" before the court—especially be-
cause that might "affect adversely the client's acceptance of the ruling
and adjustment to the situation." 118
C. TJ Theory, Criminal Practitioners, and Legal Clinics: Envisioning
Lawyers 'faking TI "All the Way"
Professor Wexler explains that some or all of the techniques out-
lined above may be used by "traditional" practitioners who wish to
make their representation more consistent with TJ's goals and teach-
ings."9 He suggests, however, that some attorneys may "decide to go 'all
the way,' and to limit their criminal practice to a concentration in
Therapeutic Jurisprudence."'" Professor . Wexler offers the story of one
such TJ criminal defense lawyer, John McShane:
Application of therapeutic jurisprudence in criminal defense
work involves a threshold recognition that most criminal de-
fense attorneys and the criminal justice system generally ad-
dress the symptoms of the client's legal problem rather than
the cause. For example, in the classic case of the habitual driv-
ing under the influence (DUI) offender, the symptom is the
repeated arrests and the cause is usually alcoholism. It is the
long-standing policy of the firm of McShane, Davis and Nance
to decline representation of this type of defendant unless he
or she contractually agrees to the therapeutic jurisprudence
approach. If this approach is declined by the potential client,
referral is made to a competent colleague who will then rep-
resent the client in the traditional mode1. 121
Thus, McShane will take a client's case only if he is "willing to accept
responsibility for his actions, submit to an evaluation, treatment, and
relapse prevention program, and to use [a I]] approach in mitigation
of the offense in plea bargaining or the sentencing hearing." 122
Once he has accepted a case, McShane tries to forestall final dis-
position to "allow the client the maximum opportunity to recover" 123 :
119 Id.
119 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 744. In this regard, Professor Wexler sug-




 (internal quotations omitted).
125 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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John McShane tries to delay the imposition of sentence for as
long as possible and urges the client to begin to pick up the
pieces and to engage in available rehabilitative efforts,
whether they be attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous or a
more elaborate treatment program. McShane emphasizes to
the client that, up to this point, the existing evidence already,
by definition, "exists"; it perhaps can be given a "spin," but
cannot be changed. On the other hand, suggests McShane,
from here on out the client can build his or her own case, can
help create evidence that is favorable and that can work to the
client's advantage. 124
In contrast to McShane, whose practice is wholly private and who
can pick and choose his clients, Professor Wexler complains that many
court-appointed lawyers and public defenders currently practice in
"shameful systems," "where crushing caseloads allow for little client con-
tact and where the only real objective is to secure a decent deal on a
plea." 125 Thus, he proposes the possibility of "innovative privately
funded organizations, such as the Georgia Justice Project, which is selec-
tive in the cases it takes, but which takes them with the objective of work-
ing with a defendant, win or lose, in a very broad, encompassing, and
extensive way." 126 Such specialized programs may be able to be set up
with "private funds" "to take over where the {public defender] leaves
off," because publicly funded public defenders generally can only repre-
sent a defendant through sentence and appea1. 127
Alternatively, Professor Wexler posits that public defender offices
could establish special intake processes "to assess a defendant's likely
interest in pursuing a path that would most likely look to diversion (or
participation in a problem solving court such as a drug treatment
court, mental health court, domestic violence court), plea negotiation,
124 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 755-56.
12
''Id. at747.
126 Id. at 772. Professor Penny White describes the Georgia justice Project as a "non-
traditional indigent representation organization" that is "significantly different from the
Bronx Defenders" and other "community-based lawyering programs." Penny J. White,
Mourning and Celebrating Gideon's Fortieth, 72 UMKC L. Rev. 515, 553 (2003). Rather, it "is
a private, not-for-profit organization that seeks to rehabilitate accused offenders and re-
duce recidivism." Id. Because it is supported by private funds alone, it can be "extremely
selective in determining who it will represent and ultimately serve." Id. As a result, it gen-
erally will not take certain kinds of cases, including those that relate to allegations of family
violence or child abuse. Id. at 553 n.287.
127 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 772.
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and sentencing." 128 Thus, cases of clients for whom such dispositions
seem "appealing" could be sent down a special TJ path and handled by
a special TJ lawyer within the public defender's office. 129 Acknowledg-
ing that "some" such "models already exist," he suggests that additional
"thought needs to be given ... to integrating other professionals—such
as social workers—into the law office context: 130
Finally, Professor Wexler fears that law school clinics may "suc-
cumb to mimicking the structural ineffective assistance of counsel ex-
hibited in many ... public sector defense programs."'" To help avoid
this pitfall, he urges clinicians whose students practice in trial-level
criminal courts to assign students TJ-focused projects, like producing
manuals and other materials that outline the requirements of diversion
programs and problem-solving courts.' 32 He further suggests that clini-
cians develop and use exercises focused on "problem-solving court"
practice. For instance, students might "consider the kind of dialogue a
lawyer might have with a client about the pros and cons of opting into a
[drug treatment court] or mental health court." 133
III. CONSIDERING PROFESSOR WEXLER'S INVITATION
Obviously, it is always flattering to receive an invitation. But before
accepting, it is important to think it through. Even if you truly like the
person who extended the request, there are other things to consider.
What is the occasion? Is this an event to celebrate? What will be on the
menu? Who else is included on the guest list? As tempting as it is to join
Professor Wexler in his well-intended movement, as a criminal defense
128 Id. at 773.
129 Id. Professor Wexler urges public defense institutions to "confront questions of
relative caseload[sl" and "find ways of avoiding the development of Mira-office resentment
towards lawyers having [the] less frenzied daily diet" of TJ practice, likening the situation
to judges who are resentful of others with greater resources in specialized, boutique "prob-
lem-solving" courts. Id.
"f' Id.
" 1 Id. at 747.
182 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 746-48.
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at 751. Professor Wexler actually discusses the level of effort used in advising a
client about "the collateral consequences of a proposed plea" and "whether enrollment in
a treatment option should call for the same or a higher standard." Id. at 752.
Criminal appeals clinics, Wexler offers, should also use TJ exercises. Id. at 769. Al-
though he does not offer a specific plan of action, Wexler suggests that such clinics should
have students think about how to handle an appeal that lacks merit.. Id. For instance, stu-
dents might consider whether to file a "dressed up brief", for the benefit of making the
client feel good, or to withdraw so as to avoid filing a frivolous appeal with the court.
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lawyer and clinician, his invitation presents a number of issues that give
me pause.
A. Proposed Change in Defense Counsel Role: The Occasion
1. Misunderstanding Tradition
Despite the openness and warmth with which it was extended, Pro-
fessor Wexler's call to establish a specialized TJ criminal defense bar is
ultimately unconvincing. First, Professor Wexler's invitation errone-
ously implies that a single defense attorney model currently exists—
which he refers to as "traditional."" 4 He never defines what constitutes
"traditional" defense representation, however, or describes the tradi-
tional defense attorney in practice. 155 Thus, it is unclear why the alleged
current model of representation needs to be replaced with a new
model involving "TJ criminal lawyers."
These failings may be explained, however, by the realities of mod-
ern criminal defense practice. In my mind, no single, monolithic, "tra-
ditional" means of representation currently exists. 186 Rather, good de-
"4 See id. at 747.
In Although others have also used the term "traditional" when talking about some kiwis
of criminal defense and law school clinic representation, this description is somewhat mis-
leading. Indeed, descriptions of "traditional" representation models are not uniform and
demonstrate that no singular "traditional" defense bar currently exists. See, e.g., Katherine R.
Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural tillues of Client-Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV.
369, 402 (2006) ("The 'traditional model' of legal representation falls in line with th [el justi-
fication for professional paternalism, creating a 'ineans-objectives' division of decision-
making authority in the lawyer-client relationship, in which the client tells the lawyer what
objective the client wishes to pursue, and the lawyer applies her legal expertise to decide the
strategic means by which to attain the client's objective."); Mark H. Moore, Alternative Strate-
gies for Public Defenders and Assigned Counsel, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 83, 104 (2004-
05) (referring to the "radical" concept of "whole client" representation, noting that "those
who advocate for and seek to practice" in this way "draw a sharp contrast between this [kind
of practice] and the traditional kinds of representation"); Robin Steinberg & David Feige,
Cultural Revolution: Transforming the Public Defender's Office, 29 N.Y.U. Rt:r. L. & Soc. CHANGE
123, 123-24 (2004-05) (stating that "Nile traditional defender office is lawyer-driven and
case-oriented," Mat "[t]raditional defenders address themselves primarily to the client's hip
mediate legal needs believing that removing or reducing the imminent threat of incarcera-
tion is their function," and that "ltdy contrast the more holistic model of representation is
client-focused, interdisciplinary, and community-based"); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Taking It to
the. Streets, 29 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 153, 166 (2004-05) (describing some traditional
lawyers as not being willing to "push beyond the comfort zone" of their courtroom role).
Moore's description of "traditional" defenders, to paraphrase a former colleague, may un-
necessarily denigrate some lawyers by suggesting they represent only some component part
Or CRC!) IS, perhaps "half."
' 36 Some public defender offices now use terms like "community-based," "holistic," or
"client-centered" to describe the work they do beyond merely defending clients against
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fensc lawyers—no matter where they work or what they are calledir-
know that representation of each defendant calls for a range of skills
and approaches in light of defense attorneys' legal and ethical obliga-
tions, existing practice standards, and the goals and wants of that indi-
vidual client.lm
crimes alleged. See White, supra note 126, at 547 (discussing use of these terms by defense
organizations that attempt to "coordinate legal services for a client, together with social
services and community assistance"). Many lawyers and law school clinics, however, have
engaged in such work foi - decades, some without referring to it by a specific name. See infra
note 189 and accompanying text.
Beyond this, as Professor Kate Kruse describes, Professors David Binder and Susan
Price popularized the "client-centered" lawyering concept nearly three decades ago in
their influential book, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED AP-
PROACH (1977). See Kruse, supra note 135, at 369-70 (characterizing the "client-centered"
model of representation as having enjoyed "unparalleled success" and serving as the "pre-
dominant model for teaching lawyering skills" for over twenty-five years). As Professor
Kruse explains, the client-centered approach to representation was intended to supplant
"treat[ingl clients impersonally as bundles of legal issues ... without exploring a client's
actual values." Id. at 382. What is more, as "the client-centered approach has grown from
its earliest articulation by Binder and Price to its current status as well-established bedrock
of clinical education, it has evolved naturally into what might be called a plurality of ap-
proaches, which expand aspects of the original client-centered approach in different di-
rections." Id. at 371. One of those directions is the "problem-solving ... holistic lawyering
[approach] that reach [es] beyond the boundaries of the client's legal case to address a
broader range of connected issues in the client's life." Id. Nevertheless, some "[d]efenders
of traditional zealous partisan advocacy" also describe themselves as client-centered in that
"It] he traditional model of devotion to a client's legal rights and interests is fundamentally
client-centered, in the sense that it places fidelity to clients at the center of the lawyer's
professional duties." Id. at 397-98 n.126 (recounting Abbe Smith's tribute to Monroe
Freedman, whom Smith refers to as the first to use the term "client-centered"); see also
Abbe Smith, The Difference in Criminal Defense and the Difference It Makes, 11 WASH, &
Pot,'v 83, 88 (2003). Thus, what may be considered "traditional" or "nontraditional" is
open to debate.
137 See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon 's Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1461,
1500 (2003) (identifying various public defenders' offices, including the Public Defender
Service for the District of Columbia, Neighborhood Defender Services of Harlem, and the
Bronx Defenders, as consistently providing high-quality defense services to their clients);
White, supra note 126, at 549 (recounting that more than half of 900 public defenders
whom the Brennan Center for justice surveyed in 2001 "responded that they were engag-
ing in some community-based lawyering").
1" Professor Kruse also criticizes misleading characterizations of modern lawyering
methods:
IP]erhaps contributing to the gap between practical and theoretical concep-
tions of client-centered representation, the debates within legal ethics are of-
ten carried out in terms that reduce client-centered representation to a kind
of caricatured "hired gun" lawyering, in which lawyers are impelled by the
pursuit of client objective all the way to the limits of what the law arguably al-
lows. While this simplification assists the elegance of theory, it renders clients
and the lawyers who represent them unfamiliar—almost unrecognizeable—to
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For over a decade, the National Legal Aid and Defender Associa-
tion (the "NLADA"), which serves as a voice for public defenders and
other poverty lawyers,'" has published criminal defense community
standards entitled Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representa-
tion. 14° The very first NLADA guideline addresses the "Role of Defense
Counsel." 141 Rather than describing a single model or method of op-
erating to fulfill that role, it explains that "kJ he paramount obligation
of criminal defense counsel is to provide zealous and quality repre-
sentation to their clients at all stages of the criminal process. Attor-
neys also have an obligation to abide by ethical norms and act in ac-
cordance with the rules of the court."142 What constitutes "zealous-
ness" or "quality" obviously depends on the particular circumstances
lawyers seeking to engage in thoughtful ethical reflection in the contexts of
practice in which they are embedded.
Kruse, supra note 135, at 440 (citations omitted); see MONROE. H. FREEDMAN & AFIRE
SmITIL UNDERSTANDING LAWYER'S ETHICS 19 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing "the false meta-
phor of warlare" that is often used by "those who denigrate the adversary system" and not-
ing "it] he true picture is rather different from the physical violence and 'bloodletting'
that is conjured up by that rhetoric"); see also Taylor-Thompson, supra note 135, at 167.
199
	 Backus and Marcus recently described the NLADA as:
the nation's leading advocate for legal professionals who work with and rep-
resent low-income clients, their families, and communities. Speaking on be-
half of legal aid and defender programs, as well as individual advocates, it de-
votes its resources to serving the broad equal justice community. The NLADA
provides a national voice in public policy and legislative debates on the many
issues affecting the equal justice community.
Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1043-44 (2006); see also White, supra note 126, at 525-31 (describing
the history and significance of criminal defense standards and guidelines promulgated by
the NLADA and the American Bar Association).
140 The NLADA's Performance Guidelines were first adopted in 1994.
141 See NAT'L LEGAL. Am Sc DEFENDER Ass'N, supra note 13, at Guideline 1.1.
142 Id. The commentary to Guideline 1.1 explains:
All lawyers have a professional, ethical duty to provide "competent" legal rep-
resentation to their clients, under the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility
of the American Bar Association. When dealing with the provision of counsel
to poor persons accused of crime, the ABA and NLADA have both called for
"quality" legal representation, a more progressive standard. These Guidelines
advocate the provision of zealous and quality representation to all clients
charged with crime.... The duty to provide zealous and quality representa-
tion applies to all criminal defense attorneys, regardless of the financial status
of their clients, or how (or how much) the lawyer is being paid.
111. at Guideline 1.1 cmt.; see also MODEL RULES OF FROE'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2006) ("Com-
petent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.").
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presented. 143 Indeed, in some, but by no means all, instances this
might mean attempting to improve a client's circumstances, 144
 or as-
sisting in client rehabilitation efforts. 145 Thus, good criminal defense
attorneys have long recognized their job calls for them to wear any
number of hats throughout the course of a given case, not just that of
trial lawyer or dogged adversary." 6
143 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'S. CONDUCT limb!. (2002) (stating that a lawyer's respon-
sibilities include serving as a legal advisor, legal advocate, negotiator, and evaluator for
clients); Ass. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4.12 mt. (1993) (stating that the role of defense counsel is
"complex, involving multiple obligations ... including furthering the defendant's interest
to the fullest extent of the law").
' 44 See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 135, at 165 ("Defenders frequently need to locate
and put in place treatment regimens for a client during the pre-trial period to provide her
with the necessary support to make basic decisions about her case."); see also Andrew 1
Liese, Note, We Can Do Better: Anti-Homeless Ordinances as Violations of State Substantive Due
Process Law, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1413, 1418-21 (2006) (discussing problems of the homeless,
including their prosecution for quality of life offenses); Lola Vekizquez-Aguila, Comment,
Not Poor Enough: Why Wisconsin's System Ibr Providing Indigent Defense Is Failing, 2006 Wis. L.
RE v. 193, 195-97 (recounting the difficulties of many indigent criminal defendants, in-
cluding homelessness and transience).
143 Indeed, thirty-five years ago this question was thoughtfully examined in the very
particular situation of representing clients struggling with drug addiction. See Thomas
Rafalsky, The Addicted Client: Rehabilitation as a Defense Strategy and the Role of an Attorney in the
Rehabilitation Process, 1 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 399, 408-09 (1971-72). Rafalsky explained:
Attorneys have traditionally defended addicted clients in criminal matters
without considering the fact that their clients are addicted. if the attorney is
successful in the case by having the charges dismissed or by keeping his client
out of jail, then he is returning an untreated addict to commit crimes, be rear-
rested, and eventually be retuned to the street. The cycle continues relentlessly.
There is, however, the means of avoiding this cycle while at the same time
improving the representation which can be given to an addicted client. This
can he done by adding the informal defense strategy of rehabilitation to the
existing array of formal, legal defenses. A lawyer should acknowledge that a
client is addicted, should show that the crime in question is related to the ad-
diction, and should demonstrate that the client is being treated for his addic-
tion and is being rehabilitated. if a favorable disposition of the case cannot be
reached in that way, the attorney could then proceed according to his normal
defense strategies.
Id.
146 As Marty Guggenheim, former New York City Legal Aid Society attorney, aptly
noted two decades ago:
Met me say that in my experience there are two kinds of institutional lawyers
who are doomed to be ineffective. First, there are the lawyers who do not care
about their clients and do not work very hard to represent them. Second,
there are lawyers who never give an inch. They fight over every detail, and are
never reasonable and never do favors for the court or their adversaries. Such
lawyers may think that they are obeying the injunction to represent each cli-
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In addition to underestimating the complexity of current crimi-
nal defense representation practices, Professor Wexler fails to offer a
clear motivation for his proposed change in the defense bar. For in-
stance, no data or statistics are provided to demonstrate that the cur-
rent and alleged "traditional" model of defense lawyering is responsi-
ble for "antitherapeutic" consequences in clients. This is particularly
striking given TJ's stated concerns about the need for empirical re-
search to support legal rules, procedures, and actions. 147
Professor Wexler does say that the concept of TJ is increasing in
popularity among some audiences, and that it is "moving rather rapidly
from the world of theory to the world of practice." 198 Certainly, how-
ever, in and of itself that does not provide support for the kind of fun-
damental change he is advocating. That judges might be buying into TJ
principles and trying to influence practitioners to do the same is not
compelling as a basis for change either. Historically, defense attorneys
and clinics have served as a check on the judiciary and its actions with
regard to clients. 149 It would be wholly inappropriate to sign on to a
ent zealously and with undiluted loyalty, but they are sure to fail. After they
have proven who they are to their adversaries and to the judges, nobody
makes reasonable deals with them. Their clients always seem to be the losers.
Martin Guggenheim, Divided Loyalties: Musings on Some Ethical Dilemmas for the Institutional
Criminal Defense Attorney, 14 N.Y.C. Rev. L. & Soc. CHANGE 13, 21 (1986).
Similarly, social workers have been part of many public defenders' offices for decades.
Taylor-Thompson, supra note 135, at 181 (noting that the Seattle Defender Association was
using social workers in the delivery of services since the 1970s); see Mark H. Moore et at, The
Best Defense Is No Offense: Preventing Crime Through Effective Public Defense, 29 NYU. REV. L &
Soc. CHANGE 57, 79 (2004-05) (explaining that Mary Hoban, Chief Social Worker in the
Connecticut Division of the Public Defender Services, "began many years ago" as the agency's
only social work intern and that now the agency employs forty social workers to staff its thirty-
nine offices); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Thav Sapir, Keeping Gideon 's Promise: A Comparison of
the American and Israeli Public Defender Experiences, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 203, 208
(2004-05) (commenting that in the years following Gideon n Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
"Mu order to improve the quality of representation ... public defender offices implemented
training programs for new lawyers and allocated resources for investigators and social work-
ers to prepare individualized sentencing proposals to the court"); we also Elizabeth Wright,
Diversion of Justice, KNOXVILLE Voice, Aug. 10, 2006, at 9 (discussing the educational and
other services provided by the Community Law Office of Knox County, Tennessee, a public
defender office run by Mark Stephens that in 2001 began modeling itself on the earlier ef-
forts of programs like the Neighborhood Defender Services of Harlem—thereby making it a
second-generation provider of expanded defense services).
197 See supra notes 28, 35 and accompanying text.
148 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 743.
"9 Polk Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1981) (acknowledging that defense at-
torneys must exercise "professional independence," "free of state control," to satisfy the
teachings of Gideon u Wainwright); see. Backus & Marcus, supra note 139, at 1069 ("Virtually
everyone working in the criminal justice system appears to strongly agree with the notion
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supposedly new, "therapeutic" way of representing clients simply be-
cause judges might think it is a good idea without first ensuring that
modifications of current practices are necessary and appropriate.
2. A New Tradition Without Sufficient Form and Substance
Beyond failing to describe the lawyering model he calls for chang-
ing, or to offer clear rationales for the modification, Professor Wexler's
proposed TJ alternative lacks clear parameters of its own. Despite the
critiques offered nearly a decade ago about the need to clarify its mis-
sion and identity, the TJ movement seems to have become even more
unwieldy and difficult to pin down, at least to this reader. For instance,
it still seems to hold itself out as nothing more than a lens through
which to examine laws, procedures, and practices to ascertain whether
their consequences are therapeutic or antitherapeutic, but at the same
time advocates affirmative legal reform. 15° And although the movement
claims that it is not empowered to modify current norms, with this invi-
tation, TJ is offering "new" practices for defense lawyers)"
More fUndamentally, not only is the term "therapeutic" open to
numerous interpretations, as Professors Petrila and Slobogin noted in
their earlier critiques, it now seems to have had grafted upon it a primary
meaning— "rehabilitative."152 One could dispute, however, whether re-
habilitative goals are truly therapeutic in terms of improving psychologi-
that the defense function should be independent. It should not be too closely linked with,
or controlled by, the legislature, the executive, the judiciary or the prosecution."); Thomas
F. Geraghty, The Criminal/Juvenile Clinic as a Public Interest Law Office: Defense Clinics; The Best
Way to Teach Justice, 75 Miss. L.J. 699, 699-700 (2006) (recounting six client stories from
over thirty years of clinical teaching that demonstrate how handling their cases "taught .. .
students," "informed judicial decision-making," and "supported the cause for reform in
the public interest"); see also AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 143, at Standard 4-1.2 ("A court
properly constituted to hear a criminal case must he viewed as a tripartite entity constitut-
ing of the judge (and jury, where appropriate), counsel for the prosecution, and counsel
for the accused.").
150 See Wexler & Winick, supra note 5, at 708.
151 See Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note I, at 746. To be sure, Professor Wexler's
current claims are more than just aspirational in nature, and do not read as a "mere lens
or heuristic fur better seeing and understanding the law." See Wexler & Winick, supra note
5, at 708. With the list of suggested practices offered for attorney and law clinic use, there
can be little doubt that Professor Wexler is calling for some immediate changes. What is
more, despite Tj's repeated assertion that empirical research should be used to determine
how the law should be modified to attain more therapeutic outcomes, many of the pro-
posed "new" TJ defense lawyer practices do not appear to be empirically supported. See
supra note 35 and accompanying text; infra note 214.
152 See Petrila, supra note 45, at 695-700; Slobogin, supra note 14, at 763.
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cal well-being of defendants.'" And, of course, what counts as truly reha-
bilitative itself is open to debate.'" Thus, the very concept of Tj criminal
defense lawyering seems to offer practitioners and clinicians little in the
way of concrete guidance. 155
3. Clash of Traditions and Values
Assuming we could agree on some basic understanding of the
terms "therapeutic" and "rehabilitative" for purposes of envisioning Pro-
fessor Wexler's proposal, the concept of TJ criminal defense lawyering
raises additional concerns, given that its seemingly singularly-focused
aims have the potential to conflict with important existing values and
considerations of modern defense attorneys. Indeed, despite TJ's desire
not to "subordinat[e) due process or other justice values," even in the-
ory the new model seems to run the risk of doing just that. 156
First, as already discussed, current norms indicate the paramount
obligation for defense counsel is to provide "zealous" and "quality" rep-
resentation. Quality representation at a particular time in a particular
case might, in fact, involve therapeutic considerations. Therapeutic
155 One can easily imagine a defendant for whom the thought of participating in a re-
habilitative plan would be so odious that to do so would have a negative effect on her psy-
chological well-being.
'54 See Thom Brooks, Rethinking Punishment (July 20, 2006) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the Social Science Research Network), available at wwwssrii.com/
abstract=918045 (disputing some theorists' claims that rehabilitation involves teaching an
offender that her crime was a moral wrong as some "victindess" offenses may not be mor-
ally reprehensible); see also NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET Al.., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 527
(2004) (noting that although nearly four million adults were on probation in 2001, their
conditions varied widely across the country). See generally Edgard() Rotman, Do Criminal
Offenders Have a Constitutional Right to Rehabilitation?, 77J. CREW. L. & CatmtNoroc.v 1023
(1986); David Shichor, Following the Penological Pendulum: The Survival of Rehabilitation, 56
FED. PRORATION 19 (1992).
155 Perhaps the same could be said of the terms "quality" and "zealous," or even "com-
petent." The defense community, however, has long embraced these defining attributes,
and they appear to find their genesis in law and in other detailed standards that provide .
guidance for defense attorneys. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (referring to "the values of zealous and loyal representation embodied in
the Sixth Amendment"); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 450 (1940) (concluding that the
petitioner was "afforded the assistance of zealous and earnest counsel"); see also ALASKA
STAT. § 13.26.111(a) (2004) (stating that the principal duty of an attorney representing a
ward or respondent is to represent "zealously"); CAI.. R. Cr. § 4.117(d) (7), (f) (2) (West
2006) (stating that to be appointed lead counsel in a capital case, a lawyer must demon-
strate the "quality of representation appropriate to capital cases"); MODEL Rut.e.s os Paor"I.
CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2006) ("Competent representation requires legal knowledge, skill, thor-
oughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
156 Wexler & Winick, supra note 27, at xvii.
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concerns, however, are not in and of themselves intended to be the
paramount considerations for defense attorneys. A narrow focus on
client rehabilitation, depending upon the situation, may be incongru-
ent with current requirements. 157
Beyond this, I fear Professor Wexler's TJ model, with its emphasis
on rehabilitation and transforming clients' lives, is laden with assump-
tions about the criminal defense client population—not the least of
which is that they are guilty, likely to offend again, and in need of trans-
formation. 08 These assumptions seem somewhat misguided. First, this
fails to take into account the many truly innocent clients whom defense
attorneys represent. Although it may be true that . a large number of
criminal defendants have committed the crimes with which they are
charged, defense attorneys play an integral role in ensuring that their
constitutional right to be presumed innocent is protected. Encouraging
lawyers, even indirectly, to undertake representation harboring a dif-
ferent presumption may work to undermine or at least discount this
important justice consideration.
Moreover, many criminal defendants who plead guilty simply are
not. Innocent clients falsely admit guilt for a variety of reasons—from
doing whatever is necessary to assure their immediate release from jail
to avoiding the risk that a judge will sentence them to a harsher sen-
tence after an unsuccessful tria1. 159
 What is more, people who commit
crimes do so for any number of reasons, some of which relate to the
specific facts and circumstances surrounding the particular offense.
157 Interestingly, this tension may be best exemplified by a comparison of American
and Cuban criminal defense work offered by Professors Monroe Freedman and Abbe
Smith:
It is not surprising that in totalitarian societies, there is a sharp contrast. in the
role of the criminal defense lawyer from that in the American adversary sys-
tem. As expressed by law professors at the University of Havana, "the first job
of a revolutionary lawyer is not to argue that his client is innocent, but rather
to determine if his client is guilty and, if so, to seek the sanction which will
best rehabilitate him."
FREEDMAN &	 supra note 138, at 15 (citations omitted). See generally Anita Bernstein,
The Zeal Shortage, 35 HOFSTRA L. Rxv. 1165 (2006).
188 See Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note I, at 753-55.
188 Darryl K Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adju-
dication, 93 CAL. L. REV 1585, 1612 n.102 (2005) (citing Abbe Smith, Defending the Innocent,
32 CONN. L. lbw. 435, 494 nn.56-58 (2000)); Andrew D. Leipold, Now the Pretrial Process Con-
tributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42 Am. CRIM. L. Roi. 1123, 1153 (2005); see also Stephanos
Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedum 81 N.Y.U. L. RE.v. 911, 957 (2006)
(stating that "lc] large and fact bargains lie about the crime that actually happened and the
facts surrounding it").
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Thus, a client's admission of guilt is not proof positive that the client is
at risk for offending in the future, and thus in need of correction or re-
habilitation. 16° Nor is a determination of guilt dispositive of a defen-
dant's psychological problems, much less problems that the criminal
court system can correct through supposed "rehabilitation" processes.I 61
The therapeutically focused model that Professor Wexler offers
also suggests a kind of omniscience on the part of defense lawyers that
promotes a hierarchical arrangement between lawyer and client. 162
Unlike many persons involved in the mental health system whose clini-
cal diagnosis may indicate what is most "therapeutically" indicated for
that individual, clients in the criminal justice system generally do not
arrive on a lawyer's doorstep with a diagnosis other than "accused." As
suggested above, a great many defendants deserve no further diagnosis.
Yet Professor Wexler's proposal implies that defense lawyers are in a
position to, and should, assess the needs of their clients and decide
whether they are in need of transformation. 10 Thus, criminal defense
lawyers, regardless of their background or training, are given the af-
firmative duty of flagging those clients—apparently based to some de-
gree on whether they are willing to admit "guilt"—who appear to need
life-changing intervention. Not only does this run the risk of having
lawyers step beyond their level of professional expertise,'" it may deni-
grate the important values of client self-determination and auton-
166 See Daniel A. Krauss, Evaluating Science Outside the Trial Box: Applying Daubert to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Criminal History Score, 29 INTI. J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 289, 303
(2006) (arguing that defendant Criminal History Scure evaluations under the federal sen-
tencing scheme, "at best," function poorly to predict defendant recidivism); see also Barry
C. Field, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements
Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FtntEsT
L. REV. 1111, 1 129 (2003).
161 Brooks Holland, Holistic Advocacy: An Important but Limited Institutional Role, 30
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 637, 643 (2006) (noting that "even holistic advocacy pro-
ponents estimate that only ten percent of cases" require "holistic" intervention); Abbe
Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and Fractured Ego of the Empathic
Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1203, 1230-31 (2004) ("Like the 'non-
accused,' the accused come in myriad shapes and sizes, temperaments and tendencies.").
162 See Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 759.
163 See id. at 747-49.
164 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'1. CONDUCT R. 1.1 °TEL 1 (2006) ("In determining
whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant
factors include ... the lawyer's general experience [and) the lawyer's training and experi-
ence in the field in question."). See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTER-
ESTS OF THE Cutt.o 21-53 (1986) (discussing the importance of maintaining professional
boundaries and cautioning lawyers against making mental health and other assessments
beyond their area of expertise and qualification).
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omy.165 Indeed, many respected defense lawyers and clinicians have
criticized this kind of best-interest-driven representation as being pa-
ternalistic, even if it is well-intended. 166
The very concept of rehabilitation-centered lawyering also seems
to conflict with an accused's right to conflict-free, unbiased representa-
tion. 167 Undertaking representation with a prior agenda of rehabilita-
tion and correction would likely taint the attorney-client relationship. A
client should be able to confide in his attorney about his alleged crime
and any other "wrongdoings" for purposes of receiving zealous legal
representation without fear of the lawyer's own personal desires coming
into play. Existence of an underlying, potentially undisclosed, 168 Tj
agenda would likely engender distrust of the entire defense bar, when
trust has long been considered a core component of the relationship
between lawyer and client. 10
165 I suspect Professor Wexler would likely respond that in the TJ model, the client re-
tains the final word and ultimately chooses whether to accept or reject therapeutic inter-
ventions. See Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 744. Thus, the client's autonomy is
respected. Nevertheless, as is further explored in the context of the "best practices" of-
fered by Professor Wexler, the TJ model of lawyering seems to encourage a fair amount of
heavy-handed guiding on the part of lawyers to help clients to make what the lawyer be-
lieves is the "right' decision. See id. at 759-62. To this author, this seems much closer to
client manipulation than client autonomy. See Stephen Elltnan, Lawyers and Clients, 34
UCLA L. REv. 717, 718-27 (1987) (noting that lawyers sometimes engage in coercive tac-
tics that work to manipulate clients); see also FREEDMAN & SMrrtt, supra note 138, at 62
(stating that "the attorney acts both professionally and morally in assisting clients to
maximize their autonomy" and that "the attorney acts unprofessionally and immorally by
depriving clients of their autonomy"); Kruse, supra note 135, at 400 (noting that "respect
for client autonomy has emerged as the most salient argument in favor of the client-
centered approach" to representation).
166 See, e.g., FREEDMAN & SMITE', supra note 138, at 51 (expressing concern that some
commentators think lawyers should behave paternalistically towards their clients); Jane M.
Spinak, Why Defenders Feel Defensive: The Defender's Role in Problon-Solving Courts, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1617, 1621 (2003) (warning against defenders engaging in paternalistic
practices and client manipulation in problem-solving courts, even if "the client's ultimate
autonomy is enhanced" by drug treatment and rehabilitation through the court). See gener-
ally Kristen Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the Role of
Child's Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 245 (2005).
167 See Monet. RULES OF PROF'L CoNnucr R. 1.7 cmt, 10 ( -The lawyer's own interests
should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on the representation of a client.").
166 See vi. R. 1.9 mu. 7 ("A lawyer may not withhold information to serve the lawyer's
own interest or convenience or the interests or convenience of another person.").
169 See Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth, and Honesty in. Representing Clients, 20 NoTitu
DAME J.L. E.Tnics & PUB. Poi'v 209, 212 (2006) (noting that the "core of the attorney-
client relationship is trust"); see also Jay Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice, and the American Way:
The Case Against Client Perjury Rules, 47 Mom. L. Rev. 339, 364 n.91 (1994) (offering four
factors that contribute to "greater distrust of court-appointed attorneys" as compared to
retained counsel).
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The TJ defense lawyering model that Professor Wexler posits also
seems overly idealistic, particularly when it comes to representing the
poor.'" He suggests that TJ defense lawyers should assist in client
change and transformation by fostering "hope and expectancy" on
the part of criminal defendants.'" For many indigent criminal defen-
dants, however, this simply is not a realistic possibility. Many of the
crimes committed by public defenders' clients stem from their ex-
treme poverty. No rehabilitative plan of service provided through our
overworked criminal courts can even begin to address this multifac-
eted problem. 172 Thus, the overly optimistic sentiments underlying TJ
defense theory seem unrealistic and may provide clients with a false
sense of what may lie ahead. They, too, run the risk of undermining
client confidence in the defense bar in the long term.
Thus, despite TJ's assertion that it does not attempt to subordinate
other values to therapeutic considerations, the TJ defense lawyering
model—even in theory—may well displace existing rights of defen-
dants and subvert existing values and professional standards of defense
practitioners.
B. Role Change in Practice: The Menu
Examination of Professor Wexler's proposed "menu" of TJ defense
lawyer skills and behaviors vividly demonstrates some of these problems
in practice. It reveals that, on the one hand, some of Professor Wexler's
assumptions about the present, supposedly monolithic criminal de-
fense model may be off the mark. Indeed, defense lawyers and clinics
across the country employ many of the practices he suggests as part of
the complex set of tools that quality lawyers use during the course of
representation. On the other hand, some of the model TJ criminal de-
fense practices not only conflict with existing practices of quality de-
fense lawyers, thereby trumping those justice system norms, but run
afoul of existing ethical and legal rules.
170 See Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 747.
171
171 Indeed, the complex problem of poverty aside, although "Wurisdictions have al-
ways recognized the importance of rehabilitating criminals ... they rarely [have] devoted
sufficient money and energy to the programs most likely to succeed." DEMLEITNER ET Al..,
supra note 154, at 12.
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1. The Not-So-New Practices
Professor Wexler repeatedly indicates that Ti criminal defense law-
yers must have thorough working knowledge of the criminal justice sys-
tem and meaningfully communicate with clients.'" This is nothing
new, however. Lawyers who do not possess such awareness or fail to
convey important information to those they represent simply are not
complying with existing norms. 174 For example, as the NLADA warns:
(a) To provide quality representation, counsel must be fa-
miliar with the substantive criminal law and the law of crimi-
nal procedure and its application in the particular jurisdic-
tion. Counsel has a continuing obligation to stay abreast of
changes and developments in the law. Where appropriate,
counsel should also be informed of the practices of the spe-
cific judge before whom a case is pending.
(b) Prior to handling a critninal matter, counsel should have
sufficient experience or training to provide quality representa-
tion.'"
The guidelines continue that defense attorneys have an obligation to
keep their clients informed about developments in the case. 176
Knowing the jurisdiction's system and sharing information with
clients obviously include being familiar with diversionary programs,
"problem-solving courts," and the "going rates" of cases in a given lo-
cale.' 77 Lawyers are also required to timely convey to clients the specific
terms of any proposed plea agreementm and the various sentencing
175 See Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note I, at 748-49.
174 See generally MODEL RULES or PROE'L CoNoucr R. 1.1 (2006) (competence); id. R.
1,4 (communication).
175 NAT'L LEGAL Ali) 8c DEFENDER Ass'N, supra note 13, at Guideline 1.2.
176 Id, at Guideline 1.3.
177 Id.; see id. Guideline 1.2 cmt. (emphasizing "the need to become familiar with a par-
ticular system before guiding clients through it," including becoming aware of the idiosyn-
cratic practices of individual judges and courts); see also Ast. BAR ASS'N, supra note 143, at
Standard 4-6.19(a) ("Whenever the law, nature, and circumstances of the case permit,
defense counsel should explore the possibility of an early diversion of the case from the
criminal process through, the use of other community agencies."); Ribas, supra note 159, at
957 ("Repeat defense counsel already know the going rates for particular crimes.").
178 MODEL RULES OF PROeL CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 2 (IA] lawyer who receives from
opposing counsel ... a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the
client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that the proposal will be
acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or reject the offer");
AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 143, at Standard 4-6.2 (b) ("Defense counsel should promptly
communicate and explain to the accused all significant plea proposals made by the prose-
cutor"); NAT'L LEGAL. AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, supra note 13, at Guideline 6.1(c) ("Conn-
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implications.'" Similarly, on appeal, a lawyer should always inform cli-
ents of the various issues that can be raised, as well as the risks that may
be involved in raising such issues.'"
Moreover, despite Professor Wexler's suggestion that such prac-
tices are an innovation of 11, good defense lawyers have long collected
mitigating evidence from the inception of the case and presented proof
of rehabilitation, when appropriate, in plea negotiations and in seeking
leniency at sentencing. 181 Such advocacy has often involved defense
lawyers working with social workers and other mental health profes-
sel should keep the client fully informed of any continued plea discussions and negotia-
tions and convey to the accused any offers made by the prosecution for a negotiated set-
tlement.").
MODEL RULES or PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cant. 5 ('The client should have sufficient
information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the repre-
sentation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing
and able to do so.... For example, when there is time to explain a proposal made in a
negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client before pro-
ceeding to an agreement."); Am. BAR ASS'N, supra note 143, at Standard 9-6.2 cmt. ("[Tjhe
client should be given sufficient information to participate intelligently in the decision
whether to accept or reject a plea proposal.... It cannot be emphasized too much that a
crucial factor in plea discussions is the duty of counsel to explain hilly to the accused the
consequences of a guilty plea in terms of the range of sentences the court can and may
impose."); NAT'L LEGAL. AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, supra note 13, at Guideline 6.2 (noting
that when discussing a proposed plea bargain, counsel should inform clients of the maxi-
11111111 term of imprisonment, fine, or restitution that might be ordered if the offer is not
accepted, possible consequences of conviction, including deportation, whether good-time
credits might be available, and where the client might be confined).
IRS AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 143, at Standard 4-8.2 ("Defense counsel should give the
defendant his or her professional judgment as to whether there are meritorious grounds
for appeal and as to the probable results of an appeal. Defense counsel should also explain
to the defendant the advantages and disadvantages of an appeal."); AM. BAR ASS'N, STAN-
DARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: CRIMINAL APPEALS, at Standard 21-2.2 (1980) ("Defense
counsel should advise a defendant on the meaning of the court's judgment, of defendant's
right to appeal, on the possible grounds for appeal, and of the probable outcome of ap-
pealing. Counsel should also advise of any posttriai proceedings that might be pursued
before or concurrent with an appeal."); NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, SUpra note
13, at Guideline 9.2 ("Counsel's advice to the defendant should include an explanation of
the right to appeal the judgment of guilty and, in those jurisdictions where it is permitted,
the right to appeal the sentence imposed by the court.").
DU &TAM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 193, at Standard 4-8.1; NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER
ASS'N, supra note 13, at Guideline 8.1; id. at Guideline 8.6. Indeed, such practices were a
basic part of my own training during the 1990s as a clinical law student at the University of
Texas and as an E. Barrett Prettyman clinical teaching fellow at Georgetown University's
Criminal Justice Clinic. It was also encouraged while I was a trial-level public defender at
The Bronx Defenders in New York City. My professors and supervisors, it was my under-
standing, had engaged in such practices for years. See Rafalsky, supra note 195, at 403-05
(discussing various "practical applications" of the "rehabilitative defense strategy" when
representing a drug-addicted client in the 1970s, including using proof of rehabilitation
during plea discussions and sentencing proceedings).
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sionals to help a client access desired treatment. 182 Similarly, good law-
yers also represent clients in seeking modification of sentencing terms
where appropriate. Although Professor Wexler suggests that TJ defense
attorneys would move to have a client's probation terminated early if it
seems appropriate, this is something that any zealous and quality de-
fense attorney should do. 183
To the extent that defense attorneys are failing to do the things
outlined above, regardless of TJ considerations, their performance
Should be considered substandard. And although it is true, unfortu-
nately, that some individual attorneys and institutional providers are
not able to engage in such practices consistently, I do not think this is
because defenders generally wish to provide less than adequate repre-
sentation for their clients. 184 Rather, their inability to satisfy practice
standards stems primarily from a lack of resources. 185 Underfunded
defender systems have resulted in a lack of training, 186 overwhelming
182 See generally Jack B. Weinstein, When Is a Social Worker as Well as a Lawyer Needed?, 2 J.
INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHICS 391 (1999).
183 For instance, last semester as a standard part of effective representation, one of my
clinic students at the University of Tennessee made a successful motion to have a client
moved from supervised to unsupervised probation.
'A' See. Joan W. Howarth, Women Defenders on Teletrision: Representing Suspects and the Ra-
cial Politics of Retribution, 31 GENDER RACE Sc. JUST. 475,485 (2000) (noting that although
"feminist women defenders derive great satisfaction from their work," many are frustrated
and fear they are not able to represent clients adequately given the constraints under
which they operate); Silver, supra note 169, at 364 n.91 (explaining that although public
defenders often are viewed as less devoted to clients than private counsel, Tin reality ...
many public defender offices employ enthusiastic, capable young attorneys who, to the
extent their oppressive caseloads and limited investigative resources permit, ably defend
their clients").
' 85 As Professors Charles Ogletree and Yoav Sapir note:
The growth of the public defense system after the Gideon decision was never
matched by sufficient increases in funding, and the situation has grown even
worse in recent years.... Largely due to the lack of financial resources, the
public defense system lacks a sufficient number of lawyers. The understafling
and lack of funding result in a situation in which the small number of lawyers
who are willing to do the work are burdened with high caseloads, tremendous
responsibility and pressure, a widely held presumption that public defenders
are overworked anti unqualified, a sense of isolation, and the frustration of
doing work that includes a large bureaucratic, non-legal component.
Ogletree & Sapir, supra note 146, at 214-15 (footnotes omitted); see also Backus & Marcus
supra note 139, at 1036 (stating that "we have known for decades" the only remedy for the
deplorable "state of affairs" in public defense services is "decent financial support front the
government for indigent defense, and the presence of well-prepared, reasonably paid,
resourceful lawyers"); White, supra note 126, at 553 (discussing the history of the lack of
resources provided to public defenders' offices).
1146 See Backus & Marcus, supra note 139, at 1093-96.
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caseloads,I 87 and other problems that undermine individual attorneys'
ability to do the job they would like to do for their clients. 188 Thus,
where lawyers are falling short in the level of representation they arc
providing, generally it is not as a result of adhering to a "traditional"
lawyering model. Converting to TJ defense lawyering would not, there-
fore, correct this problem.
Professor Wexler's assertion that TJ lawyers attempt to assist clients
beyond the confines of the specific legal case also fails to advance his
agenda of recasting the role of defense counsel. As he seems to ac-
knowledge, many private defense attorneys, public defenders' offices,
and legal clinics currently assist clients with matters that extend beyond
the parameters of the criminal prosecution, and they have done so for
quite some time.' 89 Such lawyers have helped clients, when appropriate,
with parole applications, 19° housing issues, accessing government ser-
vices, addressing civil disabilities that may stem from conviction, and
more. 191 Most defense lawyers, however, offer such ancillary assistance 192
197 Id. at 1053-59 (describing public defender caseloads as frequently far exceeding
the recommended numbers of 150 felonies or 400 misdemeanors in one year). Indeed, in
my own experience, New York City trial-level public defenders often represent approxi-
mately 100 clients at any one time. See also DAVID FEIGE, INDEFENSIBLE 30 (2006) (indicat-
ing that as an entry level public defender in New York City the author carried between 100
and 125 cases at a time).
193 See Backus & Marcus, supra note 139, at 1080-87 (noting, for instance, that over-
burdened public defenders often do not have the time or the resources to investigate,
prepare, or communicate adequately with the client so that the client can make an in-
formed decision and the attorney can advocate zealously for his client's best interests"); see
also White, supra note 126, at 553.
199 See Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 744.
190 For instance, Professor Hastings Jones of Florida A&M University College of Law
previously ran a very successful parole hearing representation program at the Public De-
fender Service for the District of Columbia, which he took over after it was founded by
Kirby Howlett, an attorney and professor at Georgetown Law Center. Interview with Pro-
fessor Hastings Jones, Fla. A&M Univ. Coil, of Law (Feb. 19, '2007). Georgetown Law Cen-
ter's Criminal Justice Clinic students help provide representation to inmates and parolees
through the program that Jones developed and ran. See Georgetown Law Ctr., Criminal
Justice Clinic, www.law.georgetown.edu/clinics/cjc (last visited Mar. 12, 2007) (noting that
participants in the clinic engage in post-conviction representation of incarcerated per-
sons).
191 In New York City, The Bronx Defenders, Brooklyn Defenders, Neighborhood De-
fender Service of Harlem and The Legal Aid Society currently provide a wide range of ancil-
lary services to clients, including representation on immigration and other noncriminal mat-
ters, and have been doing so for several years. See, e.g., The Bronx Defenders, The Civil Ac-
tion Project, http://www.bronxdefenders.org/?page=content&param=
project (last visited Mar. 12, 2007) (describing the work of the lawyers with The Bronx De-
fenders' Civil Action Project); Brooklyn Defender Servs., Client Resources, http://www.bds ,
org/client_resources.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2007) (providing referral and contact infor-
mation for a variety of social service providers); Legal Aid Soc'y, hup://wwwlegal-aid.org/
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only as time, resources, and other obligations permit. 193 'Thus, there is
nothing inherent in the current role of defense counsel—"traditional"
or otherwise—that precludes such assistance or requires modification to
allow for it. In Fact, if there were more resources available for such ex-
panded and continuing services, there is little doubt that they would be
offered more regularly. Again, the real problem is one of funding. For
these reasons, Professor Wexler's apparent discontent with the current
defense bar seems somewhat misplaced, and his proposed solution of
expanding its role with "new" proposed practices likely will not resolve
the problem.
2. The New but Not at All Improved Practices
Although many of the "new" practices that Professor Wexler out-
lines are already very much a part of what quality defense attorneys do,
a number of the suggested actions present ethical and professional re-
sponsibility concerns. Tj defense lawyering concepts, as applied, may
well displace important normative principles that the criminal defense
community has embraced for decades.
First and foremost, Professor Wexler's menu of TJ lawyering prac-
tices covers a number of stages of the criminal process, but fails to act-
(last visited Mar 12, 2007) (explaining the array of services it provides, including representa-
tion in criminal, housing, immigration, and other matters); Neighborhood Defender Serv. of
Harlem, NDS Programs, hup://www.ndsny.org/progirams.htm  (last visited Mar. 12, 2007)
(explaining that since 1990 the Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem office has pro-
vided not just criminal defense representation but other services, like community education
workshops).
192 As will be discussed further infm notes 196-216 and accompanying text, providing an-
cillary "therapeutic" assistance to clients is a delicate matter. It is not appropriate in every
case. Some clients might wish to access such services; others might not. Client boundaries
and decisions must be respected. Certainly, defense attorneys are nut in a position to decide
how their clients should live their lives and should not assume such a paternalistic position.
Moreover, unlike Tys seemingly unmitigated acceptance of judicial oversight and in-
volvement in treatment and rehabilitation, many of the offices listed above try to ofkr
services to clients outside of criminal court proceedings, in part. to protect against the risk
of punishment if the client fails in treatment or other rehabilitative efforts. See Steinberg &
Feigc, wpm note 135, at 124-25 (stating that "much client-centered work occurs outside
the hallways and stairwells of the courthouse" and "does nut interfere with courtroom
advocacy"); see also Spinak, supra note 166, at 1619 (noting that "defenders raise serious
questions about funding the courts to provide services to their clients that may be inure
appropriately funded through other treatment and social services systems").
192 Cait Clarke & James Neuhard, From Day One": Who's in Control as Problem Solving and
Client-Centered Sentencing Take Center Stage?, 29 N.Y.U. RE v. L. & Soc. CHANGE 11, 21 (2004-
05) (quoting an unnamed public defender as indicating that "Mithout the resources
needed to free up time, people object that the time they have must be dedicated to direct
client advocacy").
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dress the possibility of trial—the constitutional "main course" of crimi-
nal defense work. This omission seems to suggest that Professor Wexler
would accept two tiers of lawyers—those who try cases and those who
do not. This kind of separation fails to acknowledge the complexities of
criminal practice. A lawyer cannot always know how a case is going to
be resolved. 194 A client always has the final word on whether he or she
wishes to plead guilty or demand a trial, and is always entitled to
change his or her mind.' 95 In fact, experienced lawyers know that after
spending endless hours preparing for trial, a case may be resolved by
plea bargain on the eve thereof. And, conversely, many potential guilty
pleas break down at the last minute, requiring a case to be tried on the
merits. Thus, zealous and quality representation means keeping all op-
tions in mind and being prepared to provide the best representation
possible no matter how things unfold. Quickly transferring a case when
trial rears its head generally is not a sound option. Thus, both in theory
and practice, TJ defense lawyering seems to subordinate zeal to thera-
peutic considerations.
Various other TJ scenarios that Professor Wexler has outlined drive
home the tension between lawyers serving as change agents and zeal-
ous defenders. For instance, Professor Wexler makes clear that he is in
favor of purported "problem-solving" courts and suggests that TJ de-
fense attorneys should embrace such institutions, including drug
treatment and reentry courts. 196 He concedes, however, that some of
these institutions may harm defendants by requiring a guilty plea to
obtain treatment, by setting them up for failure, or by placing them
under supervision when they would not otherwise be subjected to such
observation. 197 Even if such courts claim to be concerned with rehabili-
194 As will be addressed further, infra notes 238-248 and accompanying text, the ten-
sions of assuming otherwise are borne out by examining John McShane's practice—the
paradigmatic TI lawyer who, according to Wexler, has taken TI "all the way."
199 See Julies v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); Montt. Ritt.Es 	 PROF'L CoNnucT R.
1.2 (2006) (Scope of Representation); AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 143, at Standard 4-5.2.
(Control and Direction of the Case).
I96 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 749.
197 Id. at 750-51; see also Mae C. Quinn, Revisiting Anna Moseowitz !Cross's Critique of New
York City's Women's Court: The Continued Problem of Solving the "Problem" of Prostitution with
Specialized Criminal Courts, 33 FOROIIAM URIL L.J. 665, 710-26 (2006) (discussing problems
that specialized criminal courts present); Quinn, supra note 67, at 61-63; cf. U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG COURTS: BFFTER DOJ DATA COLLECTION AND EVALUATION
EFFORTS NEEDED TO MEASURE IMPACT OF DRUG COURT PROGRAMS 15 (2002), available at
http://www.gau.gov/new.items/d02434.ptlf  (reporting that "[the Department of justice]
continues to lack vital information that the Congress, the public, and other program
stakeholders may need to determine the overall impact of federally funded drug court
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tation and the psychological well-being of defendants, encouraging cli-
ents to participate in such institutions could subject them to harsher
sanctions or penalties. Indeed, if a particular drug court is known for
sending a third of its participants to prison after making a good faith
effort at treatment, defense counsel would do well to challenge the
court's existence rather than merely advise clients that entering the
court's program presents a risk.'"
Professor Wexler's recommendations that clients propose condi-
tions of probation they believe appropriate and that lawyers keep an
open mind to being "innovative" leaves room for less-than-zealous rep-
resentation as well. 19° Indeed, Professor Wexler goes so far as to imply
that in some cases it might be appropriate for a lawyer to encourage a
client to take preemptive steps to appease a court—as in the matter of a
defendant with several children having a vasectomy—when it would be
illegal for a court to order that such steps be taken as a term of proba-
tion. These suggested practices fail, however, to draw adequately upon a
lawyer's legal expertise to attempt to protect the client from legal risks.
Accordingly, such suggested practices underscore the likely conflict be-
tween TJ considerations in practice and current standards.
Some of the practices that Professor Wexler proposes also demon-
strate the ways in which TJ defense lawyering might undermine the
presumption of innocence, replacing it with a presumption of guilt and
recidivist potential. The TJ lawyer apparently presses a client who has
pleaded guilty to accept genuine responsibility for his actions by con-
sidering the perspective of his alleged victim, for instance by "rc-
enact[ingl the crime, playing the role of the victim," or watching video-
tapes of victims' statements."° Such actions are suggested, not only to
convince the judge that leniency is warranted, but because it "is gener-
ally regarded as therapeutically welcome by the victim and a good first
rehabilitative step for the defendant," especially if accompanied by an
apology to the victim."' This set of TJ considerations, however, fails to
acknowledge that many defendants plead guilty even though they are
programs and to assess whether drug court programs are an effective use of federal funds"
and that such information will not be available until at least '2007).
l" See. A.N. BAR ASSN, supra note 143, at Standard 4-1.2(d) ("Defense counsel should
seek to reform and improve the administration of justice. \\Then inadequacies or injustices
in the substantive and procedural law come to defense counsel's attention he or she
should stimulate efforts for remedial actions.").
1" See Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note I, at 761-63.
"0 Id. at 755.
2° 1 Id.
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not,202 and that many "guilty" defendants are forced by courts and
prosecutors to allocute 2°5 to wrongdoings they did not commit as a
condition of receiving the plea "bargain." 204 In such scenarios, it would
be disingenuous to accept responsibility in the manner contemplated,
and disrespectful for the lawyer to suggest that the client do so. In addi-
tion, these suggestions leave no room for the possibility that a defen-
dant who has committed the crime charged may not ever reoffend and,
therefore, does not need to be reformed. 205
This example also drives home the extent to which the Tj criminal
defense model may suggest erroneously a level of inherent wisdom on
the part of defense attorneys that allows them to enjoy a position supe-
rior to their clients. There is, however, seldom any way for defense at
torneys to "know" when clients are truly innocent or guilty, much less to
"know" if they are feeling remorseful or "know" what would assist in
rehabilitating them. Assuming such superior knowledge, and then try-
ing to "teach[] clients about how to avoid future problems" 2°6 or offer-
ing advice based upon such supposed insights, seems potentially pater-
nalistic and misguided. Professor Wexler underscores this impression
that defense lawyers "know" more than their clients in his description
202 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. As noted supra notes 147 and 150-151,
advocacy for these proposed new practices has not been accompanied by strong empirical
evidence or other convincing social science proof.
2° 5 By "allocute" I am referring to the statement of facts that the defendant offers at
the time of her guilty plea, which generally must satisfy the elements of the crime of con-
viction. This differs from the more traditional understanding of the term that Kimberly
Thomas thoughtfully considers in her recent comprehensive history. See Kimberly Thomas,
Beyond Mitigation: Towards a Theory of Allocution (Feb, 10, 2007) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
204 Cf. l3ibas, supra note 159, at 924 (noting that "[enlarge bargaining divorces convic-
tions from actual crimes so that, in court, murder becomes manslaughter and burglary
becomes breaking and entering").
2° 5 See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text. Similarly, considering the intrinsic
value of a plea of guilty—that is, its effect on the victim's therapeutic needs and on the
defendant's rehabilitation—may be inconsistent with providing zealous representation.
Indeed, it would he wholly inappropriate under present norms for a lawyer to advise a
client to accept or reject a plea offer based upon the lawyer's concern for the victim's psy-
chological well-being or his desire to reform the client. Thus, Professor Wexler's sugges-
tion that Ti lawyers should consider such matters, if such consideration is for purposes of
advancing substantive advice, is troubling. See Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note I, at
754-55. See getterallyJeffrie G. Murphy, Well Excuse Met—Remorse, Apology, and Criminal Sen-
tencing, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 371 (2006) (challenging the current "culture of apology" and
expressing skepticism about the appropriateness of integrating apologies into criminal
sentencing schemes).
206 See supra note 100 and accompanying text; see also supra note 81 and accompanying
text (discussing the encouragement of "vicarious learning" for the client through observa-
tion of drug court practices),
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of the model exchange between a TJ lawyer and client on the topic of
probation compliance, which Professor Wexler concedes sounds like "a
kind of Socratic dialogue" to get the client to agree with counsel about
proposed probation conditions and future behaviors that would be
most rehabilitative.207
This paternalistic approach also colors the attorney-client relation-
ship in the other TJ vignettes that Professor Wexler sketches. Again,
looking at the "Socratic dialogue" example, it is clear that the lawyer
has personal beliefs about the kinds of behaviors the client should
avoid in the future, which he would like to offer to the court as pro-
posed probation terms. 208 Thus, this agenda, coupled with the hierar-
chical attorney-client arrangement, appears to result in client manipu-
lation.209 Indeed, Professor Wexler is clear about his hope that the cli-
ent will concur with defense counsel's suggestions about how he should
live his life210 and "buy into a change of behavior that should reduce
the risk of criminality."2 " This hardly seems consistent with respect for
autonomous decision making and individual choice, which TJ has
steadfastly claimed to support. 212
2°7 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note I, at 759-60.
208 Id.
209 See id.
210 Although Professor Wexler's desire to have criminal defense clients live "good lives"
seems wholly well-intended, see id at 757 n.73, over the years well-respected poverty lawyers
and clinicians have examined and rejected such misguided good intentions to "fix" clients
and the way they live. See Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Shills , and Sunday
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. a, 38 BUFF. L. Rev. I, 4 (1990). Professor Laurie A. Morin
offers a particularly relevant description of such critiques:
It is not sufficient for legal service providers to identify clients who represent
the community; in order to provide "client-centered" legal services, they must
develop relationships of mutual trust and responsibility rather than lawyer
domination and client subordination. Perhaps the best-known critic of the
predominant form of lawyering for poor people is Gerald Lopez, whose book
Rebellious ',angering admonishes that good intentions do not necessarily pre-
vent poverty lawyers from perpetuating patterns of injustice in their relation-
ships with poor clients. His tales of "regnant" lawyers describe the perils of
treating clients like objects to fix rather than like human beings.
Laurie A. Morin, legal Services Attorneys as Patinas in Community Economic Development: Creat-
ing Wealth for Poor Communities Through Cooperative Economics, 5 D.C. L. Rev. 125,168 (2000).
See generally GERALD P. Lopez, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PRO-
GRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 769 (1992).
211 See Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 759-60.
212 As Professor Kruse aptly notes in her examination of client-centered representa-
tion: `There is a real difference—an important difference—between helping someone
achieve what she really wants or values, and imposing what you think she should really
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Not only may the TJ practice proposals encourage defense lawyers
to assume that they know better than their clients, such proposals may
invite lawyers to assume expertise they do not have. Although Professor
Wexler contends that defense attorneys do not have to be psychologists
or social workers to do TJ work," his menu of best practices suggests
such role enhancements. Both of the scenarios discussed earlier—
pressing a client to feel remorse genuinely through the "perspective-
taking approach" and purporting to know what kinds of behaviors a
client should avoid if he wants not to offend—to some degree involve
lawyers making assumptions about areas well beyond the law. More to
the point, however, are the suggestions that Professor Wexler offers for
helping clients to rehabilitate while on probation. Although he offers
only a brief outline of such teachings, Professor Wexler recommends
that defense lawyers employ relatively complex psychological concepts
like compliance and relapse principles to help clients successfully com-
plete a probated sentence. 214 Although thinking outside the legal box
want or value on tier. This distinction marks off the boundary between enhancing her
autonomy and paternalistically intervening into her decision-making." Kruse, supra note
135, at 410-11. Kruse goes on to note that "in practice" it is "often hard to tell the differ-
ence" between a client's desires and values, and the desires and values of counsel. Id.
When the TJ lawyer conies to the table with a pre-set agenda of advancing client change
and rehabilitation, however, and "hopes" that the client will change his or her mind to see
things from the lawyer's perspective, there seems to be little question about whose values
are superior in the attorney-client relationship. See also supra notes 103-106 and accompa-
nying text.
It should be noted that Kruse also recognizes the value of challenging a client's stated
desires in some situations. For instance, she suggests that the "client-empowerment ap-
proach" might be necessary to "move the client in the direction of self-sufficiency and self-
actualization." Kruse, supra note 135, at 423-24. This approach is based on the notion
"that a client's stated wishes may not accurately reflect the client's true desires, and that
lawyers who too quickly accept the client's stated wishes as 'marching orders' will end up
working in ways that are at odds with the client's real needs and interests." Id. She is care-
ful to point out that this kind of client-centered lawyering seems appropriate in limited
circumstances, for instance when representing a battered woman who "face[s] internal
obstacles to self-actualization" and may not have the present "capacity to make truly
autonomous choices" based upon her history of abuse and oppression.. Id. Although this
author believes such an approach may be problematic as it can run the risk of client essen-
tializing, it at least suggests narrowly drawn exceptions to accepting a client's life choices
from which TJ defense lawyering theory might benefit. See id.
213 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 747-48.
214 Id. at 757. Here, again, these suggestions seem to be made without strong behav-
ioral science and empirical data to support their adoption. See Wexler & Winick, supra note
5, at 708. For instance, Professor Wexler suggests, without any real social scientific evi-
dence, that a client is more likely to comply with a probation plan if he has assisted in pro-
posing it. See Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 761, 763; see also Winick & Wexler,
supra note 1, at 621-22 (claiming, without any scientific support, that "[t]he direct in-
volvement of the youthful offender] in preparation of the [deferred probation revoca-
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might be useful to good defense lawyering, it would be wholly inappro-
priate for a lawyer to offer professional advice that he is not qualified to
offer.215 Lawyers who do so run the risk not only of undermining client
confidence in their work, but also of running afoul of ethical rules. 216
Perhaps most problematic is the extent to which the proposed TJ
practices fail to account adequately for some of the real challenges that
poverty lawyers and their clients face.217 For example, Professor Wexler
strongly suggests that defense lawyers delay sentencing for as long as
possible to enable the lawyer to work with clients on post-offense reha-
bilitation, as in the case of United States v. Flowers.218 Although McShane
and others who are privately retained may find that clients are willing
and able to work for weeks or months on personal improvement plans
to get themselves back "on track," often this is not the overwhelming
experience of attorneys who represent those struggling under the bur-
den of poverty. First, many poor clients are forced to live transient lives,
from street to shelter to hotel to wherever they might be able to find a
Lion] plan [offered to avoid immediate revocation of probation] would itself increase the
likelihood that he will comply with it and benefit therefrom").
215 See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 135, at 166 ("Some of the client's needs may reach
well beyond the defender's area of expertise."). Take, for instance, the example of the
"classic case" of the alleged repeat DUI offender. See Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note
1, at 744. Professor Wexler seems to support attorney McShane's assessment of the "real"
nonlegal problem plaguing such a client—alcoholism, See id. at 744. However, a recent
study by the Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation (the "PIRE"), a nonprofit public
health research group funded largely with federal science grants, has found that a majority
of alleged repeat DUI offenders suffer from serious mental health issues in addition to
problems with alcoholism. See Study Finds Repeat DUI Offenders Have High Mental Illness Rates,
MED. NENVS 'room', Sept. 22, 2006, www.mcdicalnewstoday.com/medicalnews.php?newsid=
52450. Indeed, the PIRE study's principal investigator, a medical doctor, would seem to
reject the simplistic assessment offered of this "classic case," noting that an "offender
should be viewed as a unique person with a unique set of issues." Id.
216 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
217 See Backus & Marcus, supra note 139, at 1034 ("Poor people account for more than
80% of individuals prosecuted.").
218 983 F. Stipp. 159, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at
756. Although Professor Wexler points to Flowers as instructive, this federal felony airport
drug courier case is rather different from the majority of low-level street crime matters
encountered by public defenders in local criminal courts. See Wexler, Rehabilitative Role,
supra note 1, at 756. As a mother with a job and significant ties to the community, Flowers
was released after arraignment on a $250,000 appearance bond. See Docket Sheet, Flowers,
No. 96-CR-01064 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1996). At the time of her guilty plea, therefore, she was
free on bail and able to demonstrate her commitment to rehabilitative efforts by comply-
ing with Pretrial Services conditions. Flowers, 983 F. Supp. at 161. In addition, the opinion
of the Honorable jack B. Weinstein deferring sentence for one year indicates that Flowers
was not a drug user or substance abuser, as are many clients represented by public defend-
ers in local criminal courts. Id. Therefore, from a defense lawyer's perspective, the risks of
adjourning her case were relatively low.
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safe place to stay. 219 Their day-to-day battle to survive, which is some-
times complicated by addiction or other issues, takes priority over re-
turning to court when required, let alone staying in touch with thera-
pists or attorneys. 220 Beyond this, there are simply not enough services
available to poor clients who cannot afford private rehabilitation pro-
grams. 221 Thus, for many public defenders and law school clinics, rou-
tinely encouraging adjournment to allow elaborate rehabilitation ef-
forts and further court appearances runs the risk of setting up clients
for failure—and harsher sanctions from courts when they fail to follow
through with promises. Accordingly, pursuing such a course is not as
straightforward as Professor Wexler might imply.
Similarly, turning again to the "Socratic dialogue," the tone and
content of this suggested conversation simply do not capture the com-
plex realities facing individuals that public defenders and legal clinics
represent—many of whom are charged with crimes motivated by pov-
erty.222 Indeed, talking with a probation-eligible urban, teenage drug
dealer about the "chain of events" that led him to sell drugs or about
"patterns" that might lead him to want to sell more in the future—a
conversation that is laden with judgment and blame—seems futile
without offering some meaningful alternative. 223 Such situations differ
from those of suburban youths repeatedly getting traffic tickets, and
present nuances that are not accounted for in the TJ model. The socio-
219 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
220 As noted by Professor Kim Taylor-Thompson: "Quality-of-life campaigns have swept
large numbers of individuals with mental health and substance abuse problems into the
criminal justice system. Representing these individuals fairly and effectively often means
stabilizing them sufficiently to enable them to make judgments about their cases." Taylor-
Thompson, supra note 135, at 165.
221 My experience suggests that this problem is even greater for clients outside of ur-
ban areas where nonprofit agencies and social services providers seem to focus their atten-
tion. Smaller cities and rural areas seem to have the greatest dearth of services for the
poor. See Debra Lyn Basset, Distancing Rural Poverty, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & Poi'v 3,
15-24 (2006); Louise Trubek & Jennifer Farnham, Social Justice Collaboratives: Multidiscipli-
nary Practice for People, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 227, 248 (2000); see also Diane E. Courselle, When
Clinics Are "Necessities, Not Luxuries": Special Challenges of Running a Criminal Appeals Clinic in
a Rural State, 75 Miss. L.J. 721, 733 (2006); Lisa R. Pruitt, Toward a Feminist Theory of the
Rural 2007 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming), available athttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers .
cfm?abstract id=933352 (examining the unique legal and other hardships that women
face living in rural areas in the United States).
222 See Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 760.
223 Similarly, one wonders how this kind of interaction would translate in other scenar-
ios—for instance, in dealing with an alleged gang member charged with assault while part
of such a group. The somewhat artificial or unnatural tone of the conversation that might
follow demonstrates the limits of this kind of client counseling: "When do you find that
you get into fights with rival gang mentbers? Is it when you are with others or by yourself?"
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economic "patterns" that may lead an individual to sell drugs as a
means of support may not be avoided as easily as speeding tickets. And
there is little a defense lawyer can "teach" a client about avoiding pov-
erty in the future. 224 Thus, the proposed lawyer behaviors do not seem
to be sufficiently in tune with the work of those appointed to represent
the indigent accused. 225 Accordingly, in theory and in practice, TJ de-
fense lawyering may contribute to the already difficult issue of distrust
on the part of such clients.226
C. Role Change and Practitioners: The Guest List
1. Public Defenders and Clinics
Turning to those who have been included in the invitation, public
defenders and clinicians are high up on the TJ movement's guest list.
Unfortunately, Professor Wexler has offered a far less than flattering
take on them. 227 Yet, as already noted, many public defenders are al-
ready trying to do much of what has been suggested by attempting to
stay abreast of developments in their jurisdiction, properly advising cli-
ents about the implications of guilty pleas, diligently preparing for sen-
tencing, and involving clients in the appellate process—despite operat-
ing within very limited budgets. 228 Thus, these lawyers should not be
vilified for failing to do more. Nor should it be suggested they take on
additional tasks without providing meaningful suggestions about how
they might be accomplished.
Unfortunately, Professor Wexler's proposal to improve services by
using private funds, in part to provide for specialized lawyers to take on
an "explicit TJ role," is somewhat unrealistic and potentially unwise.
Indeed, many public defenders' offices already engage in significant
fundraising and grant request efforts. Some, in fact, fund expanded
724 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
225 This is despite TJ's claim that it is concerned with "cultural competence." Wexler,
Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 748.
226 See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 135, at 173 (stating that "in too many jurisdictions,
clients and their families tend not to view the defender as an aggressive or especially effec-
tive voice in the courtroom"); see also Marcus T. Boccaccini & Stanley L. Brodsky, Character-
istics of the Ideal Criminal Defense Attorney from the Client's Perspective: Empirical Findings and
Implications for Legal Practice, 25 LAVV & PSYCHOL. REV. 81, 87 (2001). See generally Kenneth
P. Troccoli, "I Want a Black Lawyer to Represent Me": Addressing a Black Defendant's Concerns
with Being Assigned a White Court-Appointed Lawyer, 20 LAW & INEQ. 1 (2002).
227 See Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 747.
228 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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legal services with such monies. 229 If more funds were out there, I sus-
pect they would have tapped into them. 239 And using only private funds
to run a public defenders' office may run the risk of relying upon the
will and agenda of the funding entities. 231 Indeed, it is easy to imagine a
situation where this kind of power might be abused, particularly if
wealthy individuals wished to reform a given community with the use of
defense lawyers who would employ only TJ approaches, as is further
addressed below. 232
In contrast to public defenders' offices, law school clinics have a
wealth of resources and time to provide high-level services to their
criminal clients.233 As a matter of course, such programs, with their low
client case loads frequently staffed with two student attorneys, are able
to go the extra mile for clients. 234 In addition to being pushed to pro-
vide the best legal defense possible for their clients, student attorneys
are able to spend time talking with clients about other problems they
may be facing, assisting them to access social services, and helping to
expunge their criminal record if possible. Thus, the notion of provid-
ing criminal defense services in a manner that is not myopically fo-
cused on the resolution of the criminal charge is very much a part of
what clinics teach (and have taught) students to prepare them to pro-
vide both zealous and quality representation. 235 The real challenge for
the clinical community is not to prevent students from merely replicat-
ing the practices of overworked public defenders while in clinic, but to
prepare them for the differences between clinical practice—where they
229 See Equal Justice Works, Profiles, http://info.equaljusticeworks.org/fellowships/pro-
files/02printasp (last visited Mar. 12, 2007) (announcing that The Bronx Defenders ob-
tained funding from Equal Justice Works to help assign a lawyer to the local drug treatment
court both to monitor the workings of the court and to ensure that clients were receiving
adequate representation).
230 See Wright, supra note 146, at 9-14 (reporting on the struggles of the Knox County
Community Law Office in maintaining its social work and related programs as "the original
grants have expired and funding shortfalls have required cuts in services and staff layoffs").
231 See Backus & Marcus, supra note 139, at 1046-53 (discussing various funding
schemes for public defender programs, including private contract arrangements).
232 See infra notes 237-248 and accompanying text.
233 See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 717 ("Law school clinical programs have also taken
the lead in modeling effective representation in juvenile courts and criminal courts and
have provided technical support and training to defender organizations.").
234 See id. at 718 (explaining that in comparison to overworked public defender offices,
law school clinics generally have the freedom to pick and choose cases and may decide to
take on matters that allow them to make systemic challenges).
233 See id. at 714-15 (noting that students in Northwestern's criminal and juvenile
clinic learn the importance of caring for clients and that "[daring involves empathy and a
demonstration of commitment to advance the client's interests").
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might handle a handful of cases at a time—and real-world practice with
its "crushing caseload[s]."236 Nonetheless, I would rather struggle to
arm my students with appropriate responses to those less-than-ideal cir-
cumstances than suggest that they instead embrace a solely rehabilita-
tive approach when they graduate—by taking "TJ all the way,"
2. Lawyers Taking "TJ All the Way"
From my perspective, rather than being held out as a guest of
honor, the paradigmatic TJ criminal defense attorney who takes 'TJ
all the way" presents a host of serious concerns. The description of
the wholly TJ practice that Professor Wexler offers seems potentially
inconsistent with professional norms. Even Professor Wexler appears
to concede that it would be inappropriate for a public defender to
adopt the stance of John McShane and turn away clients who refuse to
plead guilty in order to engage in rehabilitative efforts. 237 Presumably
this is because conditioning representation on an admission of guilt
and forfeiture of the right to trial would violate the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel and trial by
jury.238 It therefore seems inappropriate to celebrate such conduct
and to promote it as an exemplar in the defense community. This is
particularly true given the difficulty in enlisting lawyers to represent
zealously the most reviled in our nation. 239
What is more, the restrictions McShane places on his services, even
for paying clients, present somewhat of an ethical quagmire. For in-
stance, although the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct permit limits on representation, such limitations must
236 See Smith, supra note 161, at 1257.
237 Wexler, Rehabilitative Role, supra note 1, at 772.
238 See U.S. CoNs -r. amend. VI; Jones, 463 U.S. at 753.
239 Backus & Marcus, supra note 139, at 1063 (describing the difficulties inherent in at-
tracting attorneys to represent the accused); White, supra note 126, at 545 (noting that
defense attorneys are unpopular figures in the eyes of the general public and politicians);
see also AM. BAR ASSN, supra note 193, at Standard 4-1.6(a)—(b) ("Lawyers should be en-
couraged to qualify themselves for participation in criminal cases both by formal training
and through experience as associate counsel. All such qualified lawyers should stand ready
to undertake the defense of an accused regardless of public hostility toward the accused or
personal distaste for the offense charged or the person of the defendant."); id. at amt.
("Lawyers who unabashedly state that they do not practice in the criminal courts denigrate
their role and function as advocates. The bar should discourage lawyers from privately or
publicly proclaiming that they disdain criminal practice.").
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be reasonable.24° And such limitations do not exempt a lawyer from
providing competent representation."' Questions of reasonableness
and competence may arise, however, when a lawyer advises a client to
plead guilty without first investigating the matter fully, regardless of the
client's version of events, and without determining the strength of the
prosecution's evidence and other possible weaknesses in the case. 242
The 'TJ all the way" paradigm also fails to take into account the
unknowns in criminal practice. As already noted, defendants have the
right to decide whether to plead guilty or proceed to trial, and have the
right to change their mind on this all-important question. It is easily
imaginable that a client who initially agrees with a solely TJ approach
might change his mind. 243 If this should happen, presumably the TJ "all
the way" lawyer would refer the client to another lawyer who would be
willing to try the case. Particularly after the case has been pending for
several months, however, important investigative time may be lost. 244
24I1 MODF.L RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (20116) ("A lawyer may limit the scope
of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client
gives informed consent.").
241 The commentary to Rule 1.2 provides that "an agreement for a limited representa-
tion does not exempt a lawyer from the duly to provide competent representatio ► ." Id. R.
1.2 ant. 7.
242 AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 143, at Standard 4-6.1 (b) ("Under no circumstances
should defense counsel recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea unless appropri-
ate investigation and study of the case has been completed, including an analysis of con-
trolling law and the evidence likely to he introduced at trial."); NAT'L LEGAL AID & DE-
FENDER ASS'N, supra note 13, at Guideline 4.1 ant. ("While the decision to enter a plea of
guilty ultimately belongs to the defendant, counsel's duty to investigate is not negated
solely by a client's initial stated desire to plead guilty."); see also Morw.i. RULES OF PROF'',
CONDUCT R. 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in repre-
senting a client.").
The commentary to the ABA Model Rules provides that "[al lawyer should ... take
whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or en-
deavor," MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 c ► t. 1. Other commentary to the Rules
provides that an "advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the
client's cause." Id. at R. 3.1 cmt. 1; see also Guggenheim, supra note 146, at 19 ("Lawyers
cannot intelligently engage in plea bargaining, for example, until they have conducted an
investigation into the facts of the case to determine the strength of the prosecution's case
and the potential for mounting a defense.").
242 Clarke & Neuhard, supra note 193, at 47 ("A criminal defense lawyer must never
abandon the core of the defense function—effective trial advocacy skills—because there
are always cases that need to be tried and won in court").
244 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client."); AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 143, at
Standard 4-1.3; NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, supra note 13, at Guideline 4.1; see
also Clarke & Neuhard, supra note 193, at 14 (noting that "[directive representation re-
quires" both trial and sentencing preparation, and that such preparation "should begin as
early in the representation process as possible").
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Moreover, I] criminal defense lawyering raises the specter of a "noisy
withdrawal" that could harm the client, especially if the TJ lawyer is
known as someone who will only represent clients who initially admit
guilt.245
What is more, if a prosecutor were dealing with a defense lawyer
who is known for refusing to try certain kinds of cases, it is hard to
imagine that he would extend favorable offers to the defender because
there would be no fear that the client would reject an offer. 246
 In light
of this apparent lack of leverage, the "all the way" model raises an addi-
tional question of effective representation. 247
One also wonders what the TJ "all the way" lawyer would do if a
client relapsed. Is the model sufficiently nuanced to permit the attor-
ney to defend the client fully and attempt to protect him from a judge
who might hold the relapse against the client? Or would the limitation
on representation, with its affirmative agreement on the part of the cli-
ent that he will undertake rehabilitative efforts, be read as permitting
the lawyer to inform on his client and provide less than zealous repre-
sentation in the name of TJ?248 Given these concerns, and the others
outlined above, it is clear to me that the paradigmatic TJ defense lawyer
is not one whom I wish to celebrate, much less encourage my students
to emulate.
245 See Mour.t, RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) ("[A) lawyer may withdraw from
representing a client if withdrawal can he accomplished without material adverse effect on
the interests of the client."). The commentary provides, however, that la] lawyer may
withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the repre-
sentation, such as .. an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation." Id. R.
1.16 cmt. 8.
246 See A. BAR ASS'N, supra note 143, at Standard 4-6.2 cmt. ("In a criminal case,
unless advised to the contrary by his or her client, defense counsel may ordinarily proceed
on the assumption, for purposes of discussion with the prosecution only, that the defen-
dant may be willing to enter a plea of guilty to some charge. This does not mean that the
lawyer should never yield on the position that the accused can and will, if the accused de-
sires, put the prosecution to its proof.").
247 I would like to thank my colleague Ben Barton for raising this concern.
249 Henning, supra note 169, at 212 (arguing that although truth seeking might be the
object of the court system, given a lawyer's duty to maintain confidences and protect her
client's interests, it should not be the governing principle for lawyers); see also Richard
Silverman, Is New jersey's Heightened Duty of Candor Tao Much of a Good Thing?, 19 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 951, 961 (2006) ("The tension that a lawyer faces in balancing his role as
zealous advocate for his client and as an officer of the court is an inherent conflict that is
not easily resolved.").
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3. Those Who Have Not Made the Guest List
Finally, in considering Professor Wexler's invitation and his agenda
to change the way defendants live their lives, it is worth noting who has
not been included on the guest list, 249 even though defenders and cli-
nicians have been targeted for professional reform. 2" Given Professor
Wexler's concern that defendants are not given enough encourage-
ment and support as they attempt to complete probationary terms or
transition from prison to the community, it seems that probation and
parole agencies shOuld be invited to think more about defendants'
therapeutic needs. In light of Professor Wexler's statements about a
lack of ancillary, therapeutic services for criminal defendants, it also
strikes me that it might make more sense to promote a TJ legislature or
executive branch to encourage government actors to better fund social
service programs in poor communities and provide sufficient resources
to already overworked public defenders' offices.
CONCLUSION
Although our criminal justice system may be flawed, there likely is
no panacea. In our desire for reform, we must be careful not to cm-
249 Professor Wexler notes that his invitation does not expressly mention prosecutors
and that they are beyond the scope of his article. He suggests, however, that it might be
worth considering infusing their role with therapeutic considerations. Wexler, Rehabilitative
Role, supra note 1, at 745 n.12. Notably, his focus seems to be on prosecutors' treatment of
alleged victims with only passing reference to their "dealings with defendants." Id. at 772
11.122. Instead, and consistent with TJ's stated concern for the therapeutic well-being of
accused persons, perhaps prosecutors should be asked to consider the impact of wide-
spread criminal prosecution of indigent persons for poverty-related activity. In my opinion,
such charging decisions amount to one of the biggest and, to borrow Tj jargon, most "an-
titherapeutic" features of our criminal justice system. See generally Donald A. Dripps, Over-
criminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN. ST. L. REv.
1155 (2005); Erik Luna, The Overetiminalizatian Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. REV. 704 (2005);
Williarni. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARv. L. REV. 780 (2006).
But see Darryl K. Brown, Rethinking Overcintinalization (Wash. & Lee Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2006-07, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=932667.
250 As a former public defender who has represented many indigent individuals and a
clinician whose teaching focuses on defending the accused, I may have recent personal
and professional experiences that Professor Wexler does not share. See Winick & Wexler,
supra note I, at 606 11.2 (indicating that Professor Wexler "teaches a course called 'Practic-
ing Therapeutic Jurisprudence,' at the University of Arizona College of Law," which does
not appear to involve direct legal representation as in a live-client clinic). Thus, I must
confess a certain level of "defensiveness" about a nondefender focusing on transforming
the current work of defenders and defender clinics to the exclusion of other institutional
players and suggesting how they should behave and interact with clients. CI Spinak, supra
note 166, at 1619.
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brace novel-sounding solutions that may be no fix at all. Indeed, like
other modern justice reform movements, I fear that TJ proponents, in
their desire to improve the court system, inadvertently may be oversell-
ing their proposed solutions and failing to consider all of the implica-
tions of their call for "innovation." Indeed, much of what the TJ move-
ment suggests, like the problem-solving court movement, parallels ear-
lier paternalistic social reform efforts that were less than ideal and
likely should not be repeated. 25 ' What is more, despite its claims to the
contrary, TJ runs the risk of gutting worthwhile core values of our cur-
rent criminal justice system.
Accordingly, althOugh it is flattering to have received the invita-
tion, and despite my respect for Professor Wexler and his well-intended
desire to improve the lives of criminal defendants and the criminal jus-
tice system, I must decline his invitation to join him in the TJ move-
ment or assist him in promoting a TJ criminal defense bar. Rather, I will
continue with my prior (somewhat similar) engagement of providing
zealous and quality criminal defense representation and will encourage
my clinic students to do the same.
251 See Quinn, supra note 197, at 710; Christean, supra note 45, at 7. See generally Morris B.
Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism: The Least
Dangerous Branch Becomes the Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. Lj. 2063 (2002).
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POSTSCRIPT TO AN RSVP252
Rather than make his invitation more inviting, with his response
to my RSVP, Professor Wexler further substantiates my concerns about
applying TJ principles to criminal defense practice. His response un-
derscores the problem of TJ 's amorphous and ever-shifting claims, its
lack of appreciation for modern defense community values, and its
potential incompatibility with the important and serious task of deliv-
ering constitutionally mandated effective representation to the crimi-
nally accused. Thus, despite his insistence that I misapprehend the
extent to which I agree with him, I remain unsupportive of modifying
the role of defense attorneys with something called a "TJ lens." 253
A. Tf's Amorphous, Shifting Positions
Professor Wexler's response underscores the serious identity crisis
that plagues TJ. 254 As I have already suggested, although they enthusias-
tically press for a new way to approach the law, many TJ writings fail to
identify specifically the problems they seek to correct or fail to describe
precisely the means by which they may be corrected. TJ may wish to
reduce "antitherapeutic" consequences in the law by adopting more
"therapeutic" approaches. Pressed on the details, however, TJ equivo-
cates. 255 This is particularly problematic as TJ presses forward with its
newest "dimension" —application to real-world legal practice—and
downright troubling when extended to constitutionally mandated
criminal representation.
For instance, at the outset of the analysis in my RSVP, I make the
very simple, yet fundamental, point that Professor Wexler has failed to
identify the very issue he seeks to resolve. Although his invitation sug-
gests that "traditional" defense lawyers need to change their ways, Pro-
fessor Wexler never explains what he means by "traditional" defense at-
torneys or what problem they currently present to the criminal justice
system. Rather than addressing this significant deficiency, Professor
252 See generally Wexler, supra note 4.
25 ' I also maintain this position notwithstanding an email exchange of over 3500 words
that followed after I sent a draft of my paper to Professor Wexler, and during which we did,
indeed, "discuss" my continued misgivings about his TJ proposals. See id. at 606-07.
254 See Slobogin, supra note 14, at 763.
255 This is a point that I have repeatedly made in communications with Professor Wex-
ler which, of course, is quite different from "[i] ope, that's not what you're saying." Wexler,
supra note 4, at 597.
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Wexler explicitly declines to explain what he is talking about to the very
community whose aid he seeks to enlist. 256 Instead, his response persists
in calling for improvement of "traditional" criminal lawyers, while leav-
ing readers to grapple with "whatever [he] might mean by that" term. 257
Similarly, Professor Wexler takes issue with my interpretation of his
vision for TJ criminal lawyers, suggesting that I have misread or over-
read his proposa1. 258 He did not intend for this new breed of specially
named defense attorneys to replace the current representation model.
TJ criminal lawyers are simply "traditional" attorneys who operate "with
an important 'add-on' component of a TJ lens."259
Yet, Professor Wexler concedes that adding a "TJ lens" to criminal
defense practice would have a "transformative effect" on the profession
and result in a "role change. "26° Thus, beyond providing a justification
and description of the role change that are, at best, ambiguous, it is
impossible to see how a change in role that is admittedly "transforma-
tive" would not necessarily result in a new kind of practice that would
displace—or replace—the current mode1. 26' It would appear that Pro-
fessor Wexler vacillates in his conception of TJ defense lawyering, seek-
ing the benefits of being a criminal justice reformer without bearing
the heavy burden of all that is necessary to undertake significant struc-
tural change in our legal system.
256
 Id. at 598.
257 Id.
258 As the reader will recall, this defense echoes a response to an earlier critique of TJ
proposals. See Wexler & Winick, supra note 5, at 707 (arguing that in his review of their
book, Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Professor John Petrila "puts words in [their]
mouths and critiques [them] for writing a book [they] did not (and would not) write"); see
also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
258 Wexler, supra note 4, at 598-99.
268 Professor Wexler describes that role change as "encouragling] criminal lawyers to
practice explicitly and systematically with an 'ethic of care' and 'psychological sensitivity.'" Id.
at 599. He goes on to explain that "psychologically sensitive techniques" would inform "how"
defense attorneys would practice, pressing them to think about "how to reinforce client re-
form efforts, how to enhance [client] compliance with court orders, and how to increase
problem-solving skills," also presumably of clients. Id. at 602.
261 This is particularly striking given that Professor Wexler elsewhere suggests that de-
fense attorneys might learn from the Restorative Justice ("RJ") model, noting that "11doth
RJ and TJ focus on healing the victim, rehabilitating the offender, and preventing fu-
ture victimization." David B. Wexler & Bruce J. V4'inick, Foreword: Expanding the Role of the
Defense Lawyer and Criminal Court Judge Through Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM. L. BULL.
200, 202-03 (2002).
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B. Defense Community Values and Ideals
Professor Wexler's response also reflects TJ's continuing discon-
nection from modern indigent criminal defense community norms and
values. He is surprised that I find it disrespectful to routinely ask urban
youths about the "chain of events" that led them to engage in a crimi-
nal act so that I might suggest what "they" might "do" to avoid such
conduct in the future. 262 These statements reflect a failure to appreciate
my disdain, and the disdain of countless other defense lawyers, for the
justice system's assumptions about, and treatment of, indigent criminal
defendants.
Things are not as simple as Professor Wexler would like to be-
lieve. 263 Again, when asking about the "chain of events" that leads to the
commission of many street crimes, it is often impossible to provide an
account without incorporating the role of lifelong poverty and oppres-
sion in the mix. Poverty, oppression, and their incidents, however, are
not easy to change or avoid in the future. Nor can their effect be erased
in the course of a conversation. Thus, Professor Wexler's repeated sug-
gestion that defense lawyers should simply help clients figure out how
to "avoid" the "high-risk" situations in the future still fails to account for
pernicious social ills largely beyond their control. It also continues to
ignore that TJ's proposals appear to be built upon a conception of
criminality and client pathology that many defenders reject.
C. 7:1's Potential Incompatibility with Delivering Effective Representation
Finally, despite Professor Wexler's clarification that "[t] he possibil-
ity of zealous trial advocacy needs to be built into the legal defense struc-
ture," his response belies commitment to seriously thinking through the
delivery of quality, zealous representation. 2" For instance, in further
contravention of his claim that he does not seek to displace current de-
fense customs, Professor Wexler continues to argue that taking TJ "ail
the way" is an "attractive practice option" for at least "some" defense
lawyers.265 He clarifies, however, that he did not mean that TJ "all the
252 See Wexler, supra note 4, at 605-06.
263 Thus, contrary to Professor Wexler's suggestion, I do not reject his proposals be-
cause he is not a defender. See id. at 598 n.2. Rather, his lack of understanding of day-to-day
defender experiences results in his work reflecting somewhat incongruous and sometimes
contrived descriptions of attorney-client interactions, which lead to unrealistic, unwork-
able, and ultimately objectionable proposals.
264 Id. at 600.
265 Id. at 599.
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way" lawyers should not fully investigate cases or prepare for the possibil-
ity of tria1. 266 Rather, in public defenders' offices, "though some lawyers
may do exclusively or primarily TJ-type work, those lawyers can investi-
gate or work with others who will focus on defenses, and other lawyers
can be available to take the case to trial if negotiations or the therapeu-
tic path breaks down."267 He rebukes me for purportedly claiming that
"the 'single attorney' model is required" in the delivery of indigent
criminal defense services, based on his view that not all criminal defense
lawyers should be required to act as vigorous trial attorneys. 268
Although I did not argue, as Professor 'Wexler suggests, that as-
signment of a single lawyer at a time is what is required in cases involv-
ing an indigent criminal defendant, this is the dominant model for ex-
isting public defenders' offices. I suspect this is so because of efficiency
and need. 269 I imagine most public defenders would relish the ability to
assign two or more attorneys to handle each case from start to finish. A
lack of resources, however, usually precludes this option. Therefore,
absent a fundamental change in legal and ethical requirements of as-
signed counsel, or indigent defense funding, Professor Wexler's sup-
port of a relaxed view of trial skill competence is highly troubling. To
meet constitutional requirements presently, an assigned lawyer gener-
ally should be sufficiently competent to try her client's case. Accord-
ingly, Professor Wexler's blithe suggestion of a "Mutt and Jeff" ap-
proach to representation may fail to protect adequately an indigent ac-
cused's fundamental right to effective assistance of counsel under our
current system.")
Thus, although it is true that we may agree in some respects about
what it means to be a good defense attorney, 1 remain unconvinced of
the wisdom of Professor Wexler's TJ proposals for transforming crimi-
nal representation in this country. Instead, as indicated in my RSVP, I
maintain my prior commitment to delivering quality and zealous
criminal defense representation—the professionally responsible and,
for me, morally compelled alternative to Professor Wexler's invitation.
266 lit at 600.
267 Wexler, supra note 4, at 600.
265 Id.
262 There is, of course, the important additional concern with developing and earning
client respect and trust throughout the representation process. Professor Wexler's sugges-
tion that any competent trial lawyer could jump in once the "therapeutic path breaks
down" to "take the case to trial" obviously precludes development of that kind of relation-
ship between client and trial counsel, which would appear somewhat inconsistent with TJ's
alleged support of an "ethic of care" and "psychological sensitivity." See id. at 599-600,
270 See id. at 600.
